1023 NSA fed Israel intel for targeted assassinations; Dr Mahathir says he doesn’t believe Russia shot down MH17

NSA fed Israel intel for targeted assassinations; Dr Mahathir says he
doesn’t believe Russia shot down MH17

Newsletter published on June 3, 2019

(1) NSA fed Israel intel for targeted assassinations
(2) Israel persuaded NSA to supply intel to help assassinate Hezbollah
operatives in 2006
(3) Signals Intelligence Directorate newsletter
(4) Dr Mahathir says he doesn’t believe Russia shot down MH17

(1) NSA fed Israel intel for targeted assassinations

https://www.rt.com/news/460785-nsa-israel-intelligence-partner/

‘Most valued partner’: NSA fed Israel intel for targeted assassinations,
leaked docs show

Published time: 1 Jun, 2019 00:46 Edited time: 1 Jun, 2019 01:38

©  The Intercept

Frustrated by a legal ban on sharing intelligence with Israeli
operatives conducting targeted assassinations against Hezbollah, the NSA
crafted a loophole giving them total access even to US citizens' data,
leaked documents show.

The Israeli SIGINT National Unit (ISNU), the NSA's counterpart in Tel
Aviv, convinced the Americans to circumvent the legal prohibition on
providing surveillance data for targeted assassinations during Israel's
2006 war with Lebanon, according to the newest revelation from the
archives obtained by whistleblower Edward Snowden.

Using the familiar rationale of "terrorism" to excuse cooperation they
knew was illegal, the NSA and ISNU found a workaround using the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence that provided the Israelis with
all the intel they needed, according to an October 2006 article in the
NSA's internal publication.

"To ISNU, this prohibition [on sharing data for targeted killings] was
contrary not only to supporting Israel in its fight against Hizballah
but overall, to support the US Global War on Terrorism," said an article
in SIDToday.

Its author, whose name is redacted, details the "late-night, sometimes
tense discussions" he had with ISNU officials who believed they deserved
an exemption from the US prohibition on abetting targeted killings.

The documents don't include details of what "arrangement" was eventually
worked out with the ODNI, but the Israeli military used American data to
lay waste to Lebanon's civilian population, much like the tech-enhanced
US troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, whose kill-counts swelled with
civilian victims after they received access to NSA targeting data.

"Israel repeatedly, and in some cases egregiously, violated the laws of
war," Human Rights Watch reporter Nadim Houry told the Intercept, adding
that the Israelis "engaged in indiscriminate aerial attacks" and cluster
bombing against "civilian infrastructure that was not tied in any way to
the armed conflict."

This 'strategy' had a name – the "Dahiyeh doctrine" – and Israeli
officials admitted it was deliberate, but despite this brutality, they
were unable to win the war. A leaked presentation about the NSA-ISNU
relationship notes that "public confidence in IDF erodes" and "IDF image
damaged" after the seemingly-outmatched Hezbollah fighters were able to
keep the Israelis at bay. Nevertheless, the IDF was, according to the
presentation, "Gearing up for Round II."

Apparently unsatisfied with the legal loophole the Americans had created
for them, the Israelis sought and received full access to the NSA's
massive surveillance data troves after the war. A 2009 memorandum of
understanding officially gave ISNU unrestricted access to the NSA's raw
intelligence data – including the phone and internet records of American
citizens and citizens of third-party countries. Only American officials'
data was excluded, on an honor-system basis (with ISNU instructed to
"destroy upon recognition" any records originating with a government
official). Almost no strings were attached to this bonanza – the
Israelis could even release the identities of Americans whose
information had been scooped up in the dragnet, as long as they asked
the NSA for permission first, and could pass the data on to anyone at
all if the names were redacted.

While a leaked presentation calls ISNU "NSA's most valued third party
partner," it also suggests there was "high anxiety" among the Israelis
"heavily reliant" on NSA data for support. One slide reads "What Did
ISNU Want? Everything!!!" and complaints about the Israelis' "robust"
spying on Americans crop up frequently in the Snowden archives. The NSA
did not seem to mind, because the Israelis were very, very grateful for
all the information.

"Throughout all of my discussions – no matter what the tone or subject –
ISNU stressed their deep gratitude for the cooperation and support they
received from the NSA," the SIDToday article reads.

(2) Israel persuaded NSA to supply intel to help assassinate Hezbollah
operatives in 2006
https://theintercept.com/2019/05/29/israel-drone-strikes-intelligence-nsa/

Israel Hated American Ban On Sharing Intel For Assassinations, So U.S.
Made New Rules

Murtaza Hussain

May 30 2019, 2:05 a.m.

AS ISRAEL AND the Lebanese militia Hezbollah exchanged blows during
their short-lived but devastating 2006 war, Israeli military officials
used private channels to pressure their American counterparts in the
National Security Agency for intelligence to help assassinate Hezbollah
operatives, according to a pair of top-secret NSA documents. The NSA was
legally restricted from providing such information but, after Israeli
officials asked for an exemption, U.S. intelligence officials decided on
a new framework for information-sharing. The documents, published on an
NSA internal news site called SIDtoday and provided by agency
whistleblower Edward Snowden, provide a glimpse into the intelligence
relationship between two countries during the 2006 conflict.

They form a two-part SIDtoday article titled "The Israel-Hizballah
Crisis — Perspectives from an Acting SLO Tel Aviv," the personal account
of a Tel Aviv-based NSA official — a signals intelligence liaison
officer, who is tasked with managing relations with foreign partners —
and their experience with their Israeli counterparts during the war. By
their account, the NSA relationship with Israel during the 2006 war was
strained. The NSA liaison officer recounted disputes that occurred with
the Israelis over intelligence requests made by the Israeli SIGINT
National Unit, or ISNU, the elite Israeli counterpart to the NSA.

"ISNU’s reliance on NSA was equally demanding and centered on requests
for time sensitive tasking, threat warning, including tactical ELINT" —
electronic intelligence — "and receipt of geolocational information on
Hizballah elements," the NSA official wrote. "The latter request was
particularly problematic and I had several late-night, sometimes tense,
discussions with ISNU detailing NSA’s legal prohibition on providing
information that could be used in targeted killings."

"Even with his full understanding of the US statutes, [ISNU Commander]
BG Harari sought assistance from NSA for an exemption to this legal
policy. To ISNU, this prohibition was contrary not only to supporting
Israel in its fight against Hizballah but overall, to support the US
Global War on Terrorism."

"I had several late-night, sometimes tense, discussions with ISNU." The
account goes on to suggest that the NSA ultimately reached a compromise
with its Israeli counterpart by working with the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence, or ODNI, the cabinet-level office that
oversees U.S. intelligence efforts. "In the end," the article states, "a
framework was decided upon by ODNI that defined the parameters and
methods of what could and could not be shared with the Israelis." The
documents do not give details of this framework.

With tensions between Israel and Hezbollah constantly being ratcheted up
— and persistent chatter about a new conflict — the logistical,
geopolitical, and legal contours of U.S. intelligence-sharing with the
Israelis takes on increasing import. The reluctance of U.S. officials to
share intelligence information in 2006 highlights the thorny
geopolitical dynamic between these longtime allies, whose intelligence
agencies are sometimes at odds with each other; it also raises questions
about the legality of sharing intelligence with a partner nation
operating outside U.S. legal constraints.

The question of what intelligence the United States can legally share
with a foreign government is notoriously murky. An executive order
signed under President Ronald Reagan in 1981 established that the United
States "may enter into intelligence and counterintelligence arrangements
and agreements with foreign governments and international
organizations." Decades later, despite revolutions in information
collection and retention, as well as numerous campaigns for greater
transparency on foreign intelligence-sharing, legal experts say that the
legal rules about what can and cannot be shared remain opaque.

"There is very little we know about the U.S. government regulations
pertaining to the sharing of intelligence with foreign governments,"
said Asaf Lubin, a legal expert on cybersecurity and privacy at the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. "It is fair to
assume that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence together
with the attorney general have developed certain policies on the
formulation and application of these intelligence-sharing regimes, but
they are not publicly available."

The NSA and Israeli intelligence drew up a memorandum of understanding
in 2009, authorizing the sharing of certain raw intelligence data,
according to a Snowden document published by the Guardian. The memo was
controversial for apparently giving the Israelis access to data about
American citizens, including private messages and metadata. But the
civil liberties implications of the agreement were even more troubling
when it came to data vacuumed up by the NSA about non-U.S. persons —
people who are not residents or citizens of the United States — and then
shared with Israeli intelligence.

As a 2016 Brennan Center for Justice report on the memo noted, "None of
the publicly available directives explains how intelligence agencies
take into account the impact of intelligence sharing on the human rights
of non-U.S. persons." The report added, "The lack of transparency raises
concern that shared information could be used to repress, censor, or
persecute, or commit other human rights abuses."

Handwritten Note Refers to Israeli Request as "Problem Area" The
memorandum of understanding between Israel and the NSA suggests a deal
was reached nearly three years after the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War. It’s
unclear how much cooperation the NSA provided to Israel during that
conflict.

An internal NSA presentation, which was also classified, recapped some
of the key issues that arose between the NSA and ISNU during the
fighting between Israel and Hezbollah. Dated April 2007, the slide deck
also described the NSA’s relationship with ISNU more generally. The
document noted that ISNU had roughly 5,500 enlisted conscripts and 1,200
career officers, and that the Israeli agency was headquartered in Tel
Aviv with "production centers" in Syria, the Palestinian territories,
Egypt, and Lebanon.

"There is very little we know about the U.S. government regulations
pertaining to the sharing of intelligence." According to the slides,
Israeli officials experienced "high anxiety" and were heavily reliant on
the NSA for support during the 2006 war with Hezbollah. A slide titled
"What Did ISNU Want?" indicated that the Israelis sought information on
kidnapped soldiers in Lebanon, Iran’s role in those kidnappings,
electronic signals intelligence, and geolocational data. A handwritten
note on the margins of the slide — affixed by an unknown person —
described this last point as a "problem area."

The presentation also appraised the war effort, noting that Hezbollah
was well-prepared for the conflict and enjoyed logistical support from
Iran and Syria. The group operated in civilian neighborhoods, and the
Israelis were receiving "bad world press" — presumably a reference to
critical news stories about the destruction wrought on Lebanon during
the war. As the SIDToday documents noted, life in Tel Aviv carried on
more or less normally during the fighting, with hotels and restaurants
packed with customers. The presentation also observed that there was
"little sympathy for civilian non-Israeli casualties from
man-on-the-street."

The widespread civilian harm caused by the fighting also makes the
details of U.S. intelligence cooperation with Israel controversial.
Human Rights Watch estimated that over 1,100 Lebanese were killed over
the course of the war, largely as a result of Israeli airstrikes and
shelling in southern Lebanon. Several dozen Israeli civilians were also
killed by Hezbollah rocket and mortar attacks that targeted Israeli
border towns. Human Rights Watch later criticized the Israel Defense
Forces for using indiscriminate force, claiming that the IDF had shown
"reckless indifference to the fate of Lebanese civilians."

"Israel repeatedly, and in some cases egregiously, violated the laws of
war," Nadim Houry, co-author of the Human Rights Watch report, said.
"The Israeli military engaged in indiscriminate aerial attacks and
massive use of cluster munitions, repeatedly targeting civilian
infrastructure that was not tied in any way to the armed conflict."

Israeli officials’ own statements seemed to back up human rights groups’
allegations that the IDF had deliberately targeted civilian
infrastructure as a means of deterrence. Israeli officials later
publicly dubbed this strategy the "Dahiyeh Doctrine," a name taken from
a south Beirut neighborhood that suffered catastrophic destruction
during the fighting. Despite employing such tactics, the IDF was largely
seen to have lost the war — or at least been fought to a draw by
Hezbollah. Two points on the NSA slide presentation stated that, in the
aftermath of the war, "public confidence in the IDF erodes" and
"military morale/confidence low."

There are ominous signs that Israel and Lebanon are nearing another
confrontation, during which the ISNU may again lean on the NSA for
support. Although Israeli intelligence-gathering capabilities are
believed to have improved since the last war, Hezbollah has also
reportedly acquired significant new arms and fortified areas under its
control in southern Lebanon. The IDF recently carried out operations
near the Lebanese border to uncover tunnels said to have been dug by
Hezbollah, and the Israeli Air Force periodically strikes Hezbollah
targets in neighboring Syria.

Over the past several years, Hezbollah leaders claimed to have received
"game-changing" weapons that would alter the course of any future war
with Israel. For their part, Israeli officials have issued a steady
drumbeat of statements emphasizing the level of destruction that Lebanon
would suffer during another war, specifically highlighting the grievous
harm that would be caused not just to Hezbollah, but also to Lebanese
civilians and infrastructure.

"If the next war indeed breaks out, it will be rough. But, first and
foremost, it will be rough for the other side," IDF Maj. Gen. Nitzan
Alon warned in an interview last year. "I don’t think any Israeli
citizen would want to switch places with a Lebanese citizen during the
next war."

(3) Signals Intelligence Directorate newsletter
https://theintercept.com/snowden-sidtoday/

SNOWDEN ARCHIVE ——THE SIDTODAY FILES

SIDtoday is the internal newsletter for the NSA’s most important
division, the Signals Intelligence Directorate. The Intercept released
four years’ worth of newsletters in batches, starting with 2003, after
editorial review. From the documents and the accompanying articles
available in this archive, you can learn a surprising amount about what
the agency's spies were doing, how they were doing it, and why.

May. 30 2019, 2:00 a.m.After the publication of more than 2,000 NSA
documents spanning four years, The Intercept is concluding the SIDtoday
project with the eighth release. Drawing on 287 SIDtoday articles from
late 2006, the batch reveals how a revolutionary U.S. intelligence
mapping system made European allies complicit in targeted killings in
Afghanistan and was later deployed on the U.S.-Mexico border. It also
discloses that U.S. officials drew up a new intelligence-sharing
"framework" in response to pressure from Israeli spy bosses who wanted
help with assassinations; that Norwegian intelligence knew about the
sinking of the Russian Kursk submarine much sooner than officials have
previously said; and that a power outage took down the NSA's nerve
center on a hot summer day in 2006.DOWNLOAD THIS BATCHDOWNLOAD DOCUMENTS
VIA GITHUBALL UPDATESFEATURED ARTICLESMeltdown Showed Extent of NSA
Surveillance — and Other Tales From Hundreds of Intelligence
DocumentsMission Creep: How the NSA’s Game-Changing Targeting System
Built for Iraq and Afghanistan Ended Up on the Mexico BorderIsrael Hated
American Ban on Sharing Intel for Assassinations, So U.S. Made New
RulesSinking of Russian Nuclear Submarine Known to West Much Earlier
Than Stated, NSA Document Indicates

BROWSE THE ARCHIVE

(4) Dr Mahathir says he doesn’t believe Russia shot down MH17

https://www.news.com.au/travel/travel-updates/incidents/malaysian-pm-declares-no-evidence-russia-shot-down-mh17/news-story/7cb88ca51f21007b625d1603a4d183bf

Malaysian PM declares ‘no evidence’ Russia shot down MH17

In a jaw dropping speech, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad has
declared he doesn’t believe Russia shot down MH17.

MAY 31, 2019

Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad says he does not believe
Russia launched the BUK missile that brought down MH17, killing all 298
on board, including 38 Australians.

The Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 was travelling from Amsterdam to Kuala
Lumpur when it was shot down over the conflict zone in eastern Ukraine
on July 17, 2014.

Among the Australian casualties were four members of the same family —
Perth siblings Mo, Evie and Otis Maslin, aged 12, 10 and 8 and their
grandfather Nick Norris, who had taken them on holiday.

Last year Australia and The Netherlands accused the Russian Federation
of direct involvement in the plane’s fate after Dutch investigators
announced they had "legal and convincing evidence that would stand up in
a courtroom".

The Dutch-led Joint Investigation Team (JIT) — comprising investigators
from Australia, Belgium, Malaysia, the Netherlands and Ukraine —
released a report in May 2018 stating that the missile system used to
bring down the plane was owned by the Russian army.

"Based on these findings, the only conclusion we can reasonably now draw
is that Russia was directly involved in the downing of MH17,"
Australia’s then-prime minister and foreign minister Malcolm Turnbull
and Julie Bishop said in a joint statement.

"The Russian Federation must be held to account for its conduct in the
downing of MH17 over eastern Ukraine, which resulted in the tragic
deaths of 298 passengers and crew, including 38 people who called
Australia home."

But in a bombshell speech to the Japanese Foreign Correspondents Club
(JFCC) on Thursday, Dr Mahathir was having none of it, accusing those
who blamed Russia of scapegoating the nation for "political" reasons.

Dr Mahathir said his government agreed the plane was brought down by a
Russian missile but could not be certain the missile was launched by Russia.

"They are accusing Russia but where is the evidence? We know the missile
that brought down the plane is a Russian type missile, but it could also
be made in Ukraine," Dr Mahathir told the JFCC.

"You need strong evidence to show it was fired by the Russians, it could
be by the rebels in Ukraine, it could be Ukrainian government because
they too have the same missile."

Dr Mahathir said it was unfeasible that the Russians, with all their
military expertise, would not know that MH17 was a passenger plane.

"I don’t think a very highly disciplined party is responsible for
launching the missile," he said.

However, Dutch investigators say there is video and photo evidence
showing the BUK system involved in the incident came from the 53rd
anti-aircraft missile brigade based in Kursk, western Russia.

They say that evidence shows the missile had crossed the border into
eastern Ukraine from Russia and returned after the plane had been shot down.

Investigative website Bellingcat had previously traced the weapon to the
same brigade using open-source information.

Dr Mahathir also claimed there was a sinister reason behind the decision
to exclude Malaysian investigators from the black box examination.

"We may not have the expertise but we can buy the expertise. For some
reason, Malaysia was not allowed to check the black box to see what
happened," he told the JFCC.

"We don’t know why we are excluded from the examination but from the
very beginning, we see too much politics in it and the idea was to find
out how this happened but seems to be concentrated on trying to pin it
to the Russians.

"This is not a neutral kind of examination."

Dr Mahathir is known to enjoy a good conspiracy theory and it’s not the
first time his opinions have raised eyebrows.

Last year he speculated Malaysia Airlines flight 370 — which vanished
three months before MH17 was shot down and has never been found — was
taken over remotely to foil a hijacking.

"It was reported in 2006 that Boeing was given a licence to operate the
takeover of a hijacked plane while it is flying so I wonder whether
that’s what happened," the 92-year-old told The Australian.

"The capacity to do that is there. The technology is there," he added of
his theory.

MH370 vanished on March 8, 2014 with 239 people on board less than an
hour into a flight from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing. [...]