737
Max - A bigger problem than a software update
Newsletter published on April 6, 2019
(1)
Boeing must stop producing the 737 Max
(2)
737 Max - A bigger problem than a software update
(3)
737 Max: long-standing design issue over Trim; Training Manual for 737-200 spell
out
(1)
Boeing must stop producing the 737 Max
by Peter Myers, April 6, 2019
Boeing has lowered its monthly production of
737 Maxs. But it should stop producing them altogether. The evidence is in the
two articles below.
Airlines won't be able to fly these planes
because CUSTOMERS are afraid and will refuse to fly in them. The result is that
airlines will refuse to fill their contracts.
If Boeing keeps making them, they'll have to
store them, because no airline will accept them.
This issue will also worsen the US Trade
Deficit.
The best thing Boeing can do is redesign the
Max as a new plane, i.e. not a 737. Calling it a 737 was a fudge,
anyway.
It will take years, and the company will
lose sales, whatever happens. But this course would save the company's
reputation and fortunes in the long run.
Boeing executives should be prosecuted for
rushing an unsafe plane into production; the Board should be sacked.
(2)
737 Max - A bigger problem than a software update
Boeing’s effort to get the 737 Max approved
to fly again, explained
A
bigger problem than a software update.
By Matthew Yglesias@mattyglesiasmatt@vox.com Apr 5, 2019, 10:30am EDT
On Thursday, Boeing for the first time
officially took responsibility for the two crashes of 737 Max jets that got the
planes grounded by regulators.
Claiming responsibility was part of an
attempt to get the planes approved to fly again. Boeing was trying to say that
it now understands why the planes crashes — flawed software — and has a plan in
place to replace it with new software that will eliminate the problem and
persuade regulators to get the planes off the ground. But then Friday morning,
the company announced that it had found a second, unrelated software flaw that it
also needs to fix and will somewhat delay the process of getting the planes
cleared to fly again.
All of which, of course, raises the question
of why such flawed systems were allowed
to fly in the first place.
And that story begins nine years ago when Boeing was faced with a
major threat to its bottom line, spurring the airline to rush a series of kludges through the
certification process — with an underresourced Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) seemingly all too eager to help an American company
threatened by a foreign competitor, rather than to ask tough questions about the
project.
The specifics of what happened in the
regulatory system are still emerging (and despite executives’ assurances, we
don’t even really know what happened on the flights yet). But the big picture is
coming into view: A major employer faced a major financial threat, and
short-term politics and greed won out over the integrity of the regulatory
system. It’s a scandal.
The 737 versus 320 rivalry,
explained
There are lots of different passenger
airplanes on the market, but just two very similar narrow-body planes dominate
domestic (or intra-European) travel. One is the European company Airbus’s 320
family, with models called A318, A319, A320, or A321 depending on how long the
plane is. These four variants, by design, have identical flight decks, so pilots can be
trained to fly them interchangeably.
The 320 family competes with a group of
planes that Boeing calls the 737 — there’s a 737-600, a 737-700, a 737-800, and
a 737-900 — with higher numbers indicating larger planes. Some of them are also
extended-range models that have an ER appended to the name, and, as you would
probably guess, they have longer ranges.
Importantly, even though there are many different flavors of 737, they are all
in some sense the same plane, just as all the 320 family planes are the same
plane. Southwest Airlines, for example, simplifies its overall operations by
exclusively flying different 737 variants.
Both the 737 and the 320 come in lots of
different flavors, so airlines have plenty of options in terms of what kind of
aircraft should fly exactly which route. But because there are only two players
in this market, and because their offerings are so fundamentally similar, the
competition for this slice of the plane market is both intense and weirdly
limited. If one company were to gain a clear technical advantage over the other,
it would be a minor catastrophe for the losing company.
And that’s what Boeing thought it was
facing.
The A320neo was trouble for
Boeing
Jet fuel is a major cost for airlines. With
labor costs largely driven by collective bargaining agreements and regulations
that require minimum ratios of flight attendants per passenger, fuel is the cost
center airlines have the most capacity to do something about. Consequently, improving fuel efficiency has emerged as
one of the major bases of competition between airline
manufacturers.
If you roll back to 2010, it began to look
like Boeing had a real problem in this regard.
Airbus was coming out with an updated
version of the A320 family that it called the A320neo, with “neo” meaning “new engine
option.” The new engines were going to be more fuel-efficient, with a larger diameter than previous A320 engines,
that could nonetheless be mounted on what was basically the same airframe.
This was a nontrivial engineering undertaking both in designing the new engines
and in figuring out how to make them work with the old airframe, but even though
it cost a bunch of money, it basically worked. And it raised the question of
whether Boeing would respond.
Initial word was that it wouldn’t. As CBS
Moneywatch’s Brett Snyder wrote in December 2010, the basic problem was that you
couldn’t slap the new generation of more efficient, larger-diameter engines onto
the 737:
One of the issues for Boeing is that it
takes more work to put new engines on the 737 than on the A320. The 737 is lower to the ground than the
A320, and the new engines have a larger diameter. So while both
manufacturers would have to do work, the
Boeing guys would have more work to do to jack the airplane up. That will cost
more while reducing commonality with the current fleet. As we know from last
week, reduced commonality means higher costs for the airlines as
well.
Under the circumstances, Boeing’s best option was to just take the
hit for a few years and accept that it was going to have to start selling 737s at a discount price while it
designed a whole new airplane. That would, of course, be time-consuming and
expensive, and during the interim, it would probably lose a bunch of narrow-body
sales to Airbus.
The original version of the 737 first flew
in 1967, and a decades-old decision about how much height to leave between the
wing and the runway left them boxed out of 21st-century engine technology — and
there was simply nothing to be done about it.
Unless there was.
Boeing decided to put on the too-big engines
anyway
As late as February 2011, Boeing chair and
CEO James McNerney was sticking to the plan to design a totally new
aircraft.
“We’re not done evaluating this whole
situation yet,” he said on an analyst call, “but our current bias is to move to
a newer airplane, an all-new airplane, at the end of the decade, beginning of
the next decade. It’s our judgment that our customers will wait for
us.”
But in August 2011, Boeing announced that it
had lined up orders for 496 re-engined Boeing 737 aircraft from five
airlines.
It’s not entirely clear what happened, but,
reading between the lines, it seems that in talking to its customers Boeing reached
the conclusion that airlines would not wait for them. Some critical mass of
carriers (American Airlines seems to have been particularly influential) was
credible enough in its threat to switch to Airbus equipment that Boeing decided
it needed to offer 737 buyers a Boeing solution sooner rather than
later.
Committing to putting a new engine that
didn’t fit on the plane was the corporate version of the Fyre Festival’s “let’s
just do it and be legends, man” moment, and it unsurprisingly wound up leading
to a slew of engineering and regulatory problems.
New engines on an old plane
As the industry trade publication Leeham
News and Analysis explained earlier in March, Boeing engineers had been working
on the concept that became the 737 Max even back when the company’s plan was
still not to build it.
In a March 2011 interview with Aircraft
Technology, Mike Bair, then the head of 737 product development, said that
reengineering was possible.
“There’s been fairly extensive engineering
work on it,” he said. “We figured out a way to get a big enough engine under the
wing.”
The problem is that an airplane is a big,
complicated network of interconnected parts. To get the engine under the 737
wing, engineers had to mount the engine
nacelle higher and more forward on the plane. But moving the engine nacelle
(and a related change to the nose of the plane) changed the aerodynamics of the
plane, such that the plane did not
handle properly at a high angle of attack. That, in turn, led to the
creation of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS). It fixed
the angle-of-attack problem in most situations, but it created new problems in
other situations when it made it difficult for pilots to directly control the
plane without being overridden by the MCAS.
On Wednesday, Boeing rolled out a software
patch that it says corrects the problem, and it hopes to persuade the FAA to
agree.
But note that the underlying problem isn’t really
software; it’s with the effort to use
software to get around a whole host of other problems.
Trevor Sumner @trevorsumner
1of
x: BEST analysis of what really is happening on the #Boeing737Max issue from my
brother in law @davekammeyer, who’s a pilot, software engineer & deep
thinker. Bottom line don’t blame software that’s the band aid for many other
engineering and economic forces in effect.??????
1:04 AM - Mar 17, 2019 · Brooklyn,
NY
Recall, after all, that the whole point of the 737 Max project was
to be able to say that the new plane was the same as the old plane. From an
engineering perspective, the preferred solution was to actually build a new
plane. But for business reasons, Boeing didn’t want a “new plane” that would
require a lengthy certification process and extensive (and expensive) new pilot
training for its customers. The demand was for a plane that was simultaneously
new and not new.
But because the new engines wouldn’t fit
under the old wings, the new plane wound up having different aerodynamic
properties than the old plane. And because the aerodynamics were different, the
flight control systems were also different. But treating the whole thing as a
fundamentally different plane would have undermined the whole point. So the FAA and Boeing agreed to sort of fudge
it.
The new planes are pretty
different
As far as we can tell, the 737 Max is a
perfectly airworthy plane in the sense that error-free piloting allows it to be
operated safely.
But pilots of planes that didn’t crash kept
noticing the same basic pattern of behavior that is suspected to have been
behind the two crashes, according to a Dallas Morning News review of voluntary
aircraft incident reports to a NASA database:
The disclosures found by the News reference
problems with an autopilot system, and they all occurred during the ascent after
takeoff. Many mentioned the plane suddenly nosing down. While records show these
flights occurred in October and November, the airlines the pilots were flying
for is redacted from the database.
These pilots all safely disabled the MCAS
and kept their planes in the air. But one of the pilots reported to the
database that it was “unconscionable
that a manufacturer, the FAA, and the airlines would have pilots flying an
airplane without adequately training, or even providing available resources
and sufficient documentation to
understand the highly complex systems that differentiate this aircraft from
prior models.”
The training piece is important because a
key selling feature of the 737 Max was the idea that since it wasn’t really a new plane, pilots
didn’t really need to be retrained for the new equipment. As the New York
Times reported, “For many new airplane models, pilots train for hours on giant,
multimillion-dollar machines, on-the-ground versions of cockpits that mimic the
flying experience and teach them new features” while the experienced 737 Max pilots were allowed
light refresher courses that you could do on an iPad.
That let Boeing get the planes into
customers’ hands quickly and cheaply, but evidently at the cost of increasing
the possibility of pilots not really knowing how to handle the planes, with dire
consequences for everyone involved.
The FAA put a lot of faith in
Boeing
In a blockbuster March 17 report for the
Seattle Times, the newspaper’s aerospace reporter Dominic Gates details the
extent to which the FAA delegated crucial evaluations of the 737’s safety to
Boeing itself. The delegation, Gates explains, is in part a story of a
years-long process during which the FAA, “citing lack of funding and resources,
has over the years delegated increasing authority to Boeing to take on more of
the work of certifying the safety of its own airplanes.”
But there are indications of failures that
were specific to the 737 Max timeline. In particular, Gates reports that “as
certification proceeded, managers prodded them to speed the process” and that
“when time was too short for FAA
technical staff to complete a review, sometimes managers either signed off
on the documents themselves or delegated their review back to
Boeing.”
Most of all, decisions about what could and could
not be delegated were being made by
managers concerned about the timeline, rather than by the agency’s technical experts.
It’s not entirely clear at this point why
the FAA was so determined to get the 737 cleared quickly (there will be more
investigations), but if you recall the political circumstances of this period in
Barack Obama’s presidency, you can quickly get a general sense of the
issue.
Boeing is not just a big company with a
significant lobbying presence in Washington; it’s a major manufacturing company
with a strong global export presence and a source of many good-paying union
jobs. In short, it was exactly the kind of company the powers that be were eager
to promote — with the Obama White House, for example, proudly going to bat for
the Export-Import Bank as a key way to sustain America’s aerospace
industry.
A story about overweening regulators
delaying an iconic American company’s product launch and costing good jobs
compared to the European competition would have looked very bad. And the fact
that the whole purpose of the plane was to be more fuel-efficient only made
getting it off the ground a bigger priority. But the incentives really were
reasonably aligned, and Boeing has only caused problems for itself by cutting
corners.
Boeing is now in a bad situation
One emblem of the whole situation is that as
the 737 Max engineering team piled kludge on top of kludge, they came up with a
cockpit warning light that would alert the pilots if the plane’s two
angle-of-attack sensors disagreed.
But then, as Jon Ostrower reported for the
Air Current, Boeing’s team decided to
make the warning light an optional add-on, like how car companies will
upcharge you for a moon roof.
The light cost $80,000 extra per plane and neither
Lion Air nor Ethiopian chose to buy it, perhaps figuring that Boeing would
not sell a plane (nor would the FAA allow it to) that was not basically safe to
fly. In the wake of the crashes, Boeing has decided to revisit this decision and
make the light standard on all aircraft.
Now, to be clear, Boeing has lost about $40
billion in stock market valuation since the crash, so it’s not like cheating out
on the warning light turned out to have been a brilliant business decision or
anything.
This, fundamentally, is one reason the FAA
has become comfortable working so closely with Boeing on safety regulations: The
nature of the airline industry is such that there’s no real money to be made selling
airplanes that have a poor safety track record. One could even imagine
sketching out a utopian libertarian argument to the effect that there’s no real
need for a government role in certifying new airplanes at all, precisely because
there’s no reason to think it’s profitable to make unsafe ones.
The real world, of course, is quite a bit
different from that, and different individuals and institutions face particular
pressures that can lead them to take actions that don’t collectively make sense.
Looking back, Boeing probably wishes it had just stuck with the “build a new
plane” plan and toughed out a few years of rough sales, rather than ending up in
the current situation. Right now the company is, in effect, trying to patch
things up piecemeal — a software update here, a new warning light there, etc. —
in hopes of persuading global regulatory agencies to let its planes fly
again.
But even once that’s done, Boeing faces the
task of convincing airlines to actually buy its planes. An informative David
Ljunggren article for Reuters reminds us that a somewhat comparable situation
arose in 1965 when three then-new Boeing 727 jetliners crashed.
There wasn’t really anything unsound about
the 727 planes, but many pilots didn’t fully understand how to operate the new
flaps — arguably a parallel to the MCAS situation with the 737 Max — which
spurred some additional training and changes to the operation manual. Passengers
avoided the planes for months, but eventually came back as there were no more
crashes, and the 727 went on to fly safely for decades. Boeing hopes to have a
similar happy ending to this saga, but so far it seems to be a long way from
that point. And the immediate future likely involves more tough
questions.
A political scandal on slow burn
The 737 Max was briefly a topic of political
controversy in the United States as foreign regulators grounded the planes, but
President Donald Trump — after speaking personally to Boeing’s CEO — declined to
follow. Many members of Congress (from both parties) called on him to
reconsider, which he rather quickly did, pushing the whole topic off
Washington’s front burner.
But Trump is generally friendly to Boeing
(he even has a former Boeing executive, Patrick Shanahan, serving as acting
defense secretary, despite an ongoing ethics inquiry into charges that Shanahan
unfairly favors his former employer), and Republicans are generally averse to
harsh regulatory crackdowns. The most important decisions in the mix appear to
have been made back during the Obama administration, so it’s also difficult for
Democrats to go after this issue. Meanwhile, Washington has been embroiled in
wrangling over special counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation, and a new health
care battlefield opened up as well.
That said, on March 27, FAA officials faced the Senate
Commerce Committee’s Subcommittee on Aviation and Space at a hearing called
by subcommittee Chair Ted Cruz (R-TX). Regulators committed at the hearing to
revamp the way they certify new planes, in light of the flaws that were revealed
in the previous certification process.
The questions at stake, however, are now
much bigger than one subcommittee. Billions of dollars are on the line for
Boeing, the airlines that fly 737s, and the workers who build the planes.
And since a central element of this story is the credibility of the FAA’s
process — in the eyes of the American people and of foreign regulatory agencies
— it almost certainly won’t get sorted out without more involvement from the
actual decision-makers in the US government.
(3)
737 Max: long-standing design issue over Trim; Training Manual for 737-200 spell
out Trim maneuver
https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safety/vestigal-design-issue-clouds-737-max-crash-investigations/
Vestigial design issue clouds 737 Max crash
investigations
Jon Ostrower
The Air Current
April 4, 2019
A 53-year old idiosyncrasy in the 737's
design is expected to become a focus of the inquests.
The seeds of an intensifying crisis in 2019
with the planet’s most popular commercial airliner may have been planted more
than a half-century ago.
Five months after the crash of Lion Air 610,
every Boeing 737 Max-trained pilot on the planet was familiar with the MCAS
system. They knew how it worked and knew how to disable it should they find it
behaving in a way that put their airplane in danger. Flipping two cut-out switches would be
sufficient, according to the Boeing guidance as part of the memorized
checklist to troubleshoot errant movement of the horizontal stabilizer trim.
Then crews would manually hand crank the jet’s trim wheel to right the nose. At
least initially, the crew of Ethiopian 302 did just that, according to the
preliminary report into the crash released Thursday.
The
recovery effort didn’t succeed and the trim wheel didn’t raise the jet’s
nose. According to the 33 page report, the crew
reactivated the electronic trim controls, causing the MCAS system to activate
and push the jet’s nose down for a fourth and final time. With little altitude
to recover, the 737 Max impacted the ground near Bishoftu, Ethiopia, killing all
157 aboard. The crash sparked the global grounding of the 737 Max days
later.
The non-responsive trim wheel and the crew’s
initial by-the-book efforts to save aircraft are expected to be an increasing
focus of the myriad of inquiries into the 737 Max and its automated flight
control system, according to air safety experts. But a vestigial design
idiosyncrasy in the 737 may offer one clear explanation according to a former
Boeing flight controls engineer, Peter Lemme, along with the procedures for
recovering a badly configured 737 horizontal stabilizer that date to the early
1980s and before.
Three generations of 737s ago, pilots flying the 737-200 — a slightly
longer version of the original 1967 airliner — were trained that if the jet’s horizontal
stabilizer tilts too far — pushing the jet’s nose downward — hand cranking the trim wheel won’t work
(after flipping the cut-out switches) while at the same time pulling back on the
controls, according to Lemme and an Australian pilot who sought anonymity to
speak freely about his experience training on the 737-200.
The trim wheel barely budges, but
why?
As pilots would pull on the jet’s controls
to raise the nose of the aircraft, the aerodynamic forces on the tail’s elevator
(trying to raise the nose) would create an opposing force that effectively
paralyzes the jackscrew mechanism that moves the stabilizer, explained Lemme,
ultimately making it extremely difficult to crank the trim wheel by hand. The
condition is amplified as speed — and air flow over the stabilizer —
increases.
“I’m very confident [this flight control
issue is] going to be looked at closely as part of the many reviews that are
ongoing with these accidents,” said Jeff Guzzetti, former director of the
Federal Aviation Administration’s Accident Investigation Division. Guzzetti also
noted that the high rate of speed and steadily maintained engine thrust are also
likely to be considered compounding factors.
The FAA announced Wednesday that it formed a
joint technical review with NASA,
industry representatives and nine civil aviation authorities to examine the
737 Max’s automated flight control systems and training. The joint review is the
latest in a series of inquests and follow U.S. Congressional, the Departments of
Transportation and Justice and the twin international investigations into the
crash of Flight 302 and Lion Air 610 on October 29, 2018 near
Jakarta.
Boeing Commercial Airplanes Chief Executive
Kevin McAllister said, “We will carefully review the…preliminary report, and
will take any and all additional steps necessary to enhance the safety of our
aircraft.” The company is currently developing updates to its training and
software to “to ensure unintended MCAS activation will not occur
again.”
“It’s our responsibility to eliminate this
risk. We own it and we know how to do it,” said Boeing Chief Executive Dennis
Muilenburg in a lengthy message posted Thursday.
Unresponsive Manual Trim
Three minutes after first experiencing
flight controls issues with the Ethiopian 737 Max, the captain of Flight 302,
Yared Getachew, asked his first officer “if the trim is functional,” according
to the preliminary report. The first officer “replied that the trim was not
working and asked if he could try it manually. The Captain told him to try.”
Eight seconds later First Officer Ahmed Nur Mohammed “replied that it is not
working.” The report notes that the controls of the jet were pulled to raise the
jet’s nose from the moment the MCAS system activates erroneously.
What contribution, if any, the lockup —
known as a mistrim — played in the
Ethiopian crash is unclear, but the revelation of a long-standing design issue adds a fresh
layer of complexity into the investigations and what guidance and training was
provided to 737 Max pilots to recover from an erroneous activation of the MCAS
system.
Lemme posted his initial summation of the
conditions that would create a flight control lockup prior to Tuesday evening’s
Wall Street Journal report that revealed the crew had initially followed proper
procedures. Lemme deliberately included no mention of the Ethiopian crash.
Without supporting facts from the preliminary report, Lemme did not want to
imply a link to the on-going Ethiopian investigation. The Air Current was
interviewing Lemme about the mistrim issue as that news broke on Tuesday
evening.
Separately, Lemme has found himself in the
middle of the investigation itself and said that he was served on Monday
afternoon with a wide-ranging subpoena from the Department of Justice as part of
its criminal inquiry into the 737 Max. Lemme left Boeing 22 years ago and was
not involved in any aspect of the development of the 737 Max.
Lemme is not the only one to note the
compounded challenge of trying to
manually crank the trim wheel while attempting to keep the nose of the aircraft
raised. YouTube Channel Mentour Pilot, in conjunction with Leeham News,
recreated the same conditions inside a 737 Next Generation simulator. The older generation 737 does not have MCAS
— a feature exclusive to the 737 Max — but can simulate a horizontal stabilizer’s
runaway trim. The video intended to illustrate how the design issue could
compound an already difficult situation, even with all the proper procedures
carried out. With the trim pushing the nose down and the controls pulled back by
the pilot to maintain altitude, the
first officer could barely crank the trim wheel, nearly out of breath while
fighting the mechanical system. The video was only posted briefly on Wednesday
morning before it was removed.
Detailed guidance on handling this situation
isn’t part of the contemporary 737 training manual, however it does makes
reference to this condition. “Excessive airloads on the stabilizer may require
effort by both pilots to correct the mis-trim. In extreme cases it may be
necessary to aerodynamically relieve the airloads to allow manual
trimming.”
A Roller Coaster Recovery
Training materials from the early 1980s model 737-200 spell out the
recovery maneuver directly. “If other methods fail
to relieve the elevator load and control column force, use the “roller coaster”
technique,” according to Boeing procedures dated February 1, 1982 for flying the
737-200. The original documentation was provided to The Air Current by the
Australian pilot from his days flying the early-model 737.
“My company practiced the Boeing-stated
‘roller coaster’ techniques during 737-200 simulator training in those days,”
said the pilot in an email.
An excerpt from the 1982 pilot training
manual for the Boeing 737-200. Courtesy of Centaurus.
In other words, first relax the controls back to neutral
before attempting to crank the trim wheel. Then quickly spin the trim wheel
for a few moments, then pull the controls back again. Repeat until the aircraft
is stabilized. Think of it like reeling
in a fish — it’s incredibly hard to crank the reel handle if you’re pulling
back on the rod. You’d relax and lean
the rod forward to quickly reel in the next length of line.
In the case of a stabilizer mistrimmed to
lower the nose (in an erroneous MCAS activation on the 737 Max), the “roller coaster” is a repeated descending
and leveling of the aircraft. The maneuver ultimately relies on having
enough altitude to recover and level the aircraft.
The detailed recovery maneuver was not
included in the subsequent training documents for the 737 Classics in the
mid-1980s, the 737 Next Generation in the 1990s nor most recently with the 737
Max. Additional Boeing documentation dating back to 1975 identified the roller
coaster method as the “least desirable” to recover the aircraft during a mistrim
situation.
“For some inexplicable reason, Boeing
manuals have since deleted what was then — and still is — vital handling
information for flight crews,” the Australian pilot wrote on pilot forum
PPRUNE.
An earlier version of this article stated
that the aerodynamic forces on the tail’s elevator (trying to raise the nose)
and horizontal stabilizer (positioned to lower the nose) would combine to
paralyze the jackscrew. In fact, the elevator alone would overwhelm the crew’s
ability to manually trim the nose upward while struggling to maintain altitude
with an improperly configured stabilizer. The graphic and article have been
updated to reflect this.
Jon Ostrower is Editor-in-chief of The Air
Current. Prior to launching TAC in June 2018, Ostrower served as Aviation Editor
for CNN Worldwide, guiding the network's global coverage of the business and
operations of flying. Ostrower joined CNN in 2016 following four and half years
at the Wall Street Journal. Based first in Chicago and then in Washington, D.C.
he covered Boeing, aviation safety and the business of global aerospace. Before
that, Ostrower was editor of the award-winning FlightBlogger for Flightglobal
and Flight International Magazine covering the development of the Boeing 787
Dreamliner and other new aircraft programs from 2007 to 2012. Ostrower, a Boston
native, graduated from The George Washington University's School of Media and
Public Affairs with a bachelor's degree in Political Communication. He is based
in Seattle.
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