314 US report on Cheonan sinking made no mention of Foal Eagle war game under way; or that four Aegis warships (3 US,1 South Korean) were participating

US report on Cheonan sinking made no mention of Foal Eagle war game under way; or that four Aegis warships (3 US, 1 South Korean) were participating

(1) Not much poverty in Thailand, but no credit to Thaksin - Robert Woodrow
(2) Leading South Korean officials said no evidence Cheonan sunk by North
(3) US report on Cheonan sinking made no mention of Foal Eagle war game under way; or that four Aegis warships (3 US, 1 South Korean) were participating

(1) Not much poverty in Thailand, but no credit to Thaksin - Robert Woodrow
From: Sandhya Jain <sandhya206@bol.net.in>  Date: 30.05.2010 05:13 AM

The Down-Trodden Rural Poor of Thailand

Robert Woodrow

2010-05-20 17:31:17

http://www.thaivisa.com/forum/trodden-Rural-Poor-Thailand-t367424.html

It's not quite what you think

Here's what you need to know about the rural have-nots of Thailand . They are the richest poor people in the Third World . And they owe none of their affluence to Thaksin Shinawatra.

Fugitive former Prime Minster Thaksin, a billionaire wanted in connection with corruption and tax-evasion on a staggeringly egregious scale, has done a remarkable job of convincing the world that he is the champion of the rural poor in Thailand, and that such prosperity as the farmer enjoys is in some way due to him. Yet all of "his" programs have been in place for decades. His well-financed public-relations machine merely invented catchy new terms for them.

In Europe and North Ame rica , farmers tend to be affluent. A comparison is therefore not at all meaningful. But take a village carpenter in Thailand 's northeast and compare him with a wood-worker in a small town in Iowa . To the Ame rican, the Thai seems impoverished, his house appalling basic, his expectations in life distressingly limited. But the Thai carpenter probably lives on family land rent-free, pays nothing to moderate the climate, produces his own vegetables, chickens, eggs and pork, and rides his own motor-cycle to his jobs. He's seen the Ame rican lifestyle on TV, and it's so far beyond the range of his experience, he doesn't feel deprived or envious.

Every village in Thailand was on the electricity grid long before Thaksin came on the scene, and virtually every village family has a refrigerator, electric rice-cooker, TV, radio and a couple of oscillating fans. Almost all rural households have a motorcycle, though it may be old and battered. In every village several families own pickup trucks. Animals are no longer used for farm work except in extremely remote corners of the kingdom. If farmers don't have a mini-tractor of their own, they rent or borrow one from a neighbor.

The "landless peasant" class exists, but is very small when compared with the Philippines , India and much of South Ame rica . The rich absentee farm landlord is almost unknown. Most farming families tend a small plot of land they own outright, mortgage-free (due to unscrupulous practices in the past, an outdated, paternalistic law prevents them putting up land as security with money-lenders, though they may borrow on anticipated harvests.) They sell a small cash crop through a co-operative. Their grown-up or adolescent children supplement the family income from jobs they hold in the cities.

Thailand, like the U.S. , has a fallen-through-the-cracks underclass. While statistics*, as everywhere, have to be taken with a large measure of scepticism, officially 10% of the population is below the poverty line (12% in the U.S. , 14% in Britain , 36% in Bangladesh ). Of course, that means the poverty line for Thailand and no international comparisons are invoked. Poverty doesn't necessarily mean doing without TV or not being able to lean a beat-up old 100 c.c. Honda Dream by the door.

Unemployment in Thailand is 1.4% -- among the lowest in the world. Here it has to be cautioned that employment statistics are notoriously unreliable. Even in advanced countries, economists cannot agree whether to include the under-employed and those not actively seeking work. But unskilled work, if not well-paid, is not hard to find. My Bangkok apartment building has had a "security guard wanted" sign out for weeks.

During the dry season, many farmers supplement their income with construction work in the cities. But some prefer to do without extra luxuries and live the slow-paced, well-fed rural life. Two or three years ago, I found it impossible for several weeks to find a plumber to put in a new bathroom. Many "peasants" have become self-employed entrepreneurs and done well for themselves. Thaksin's policies had no discernible impact on the labor force.

There is no population pressure in Thailand , since each female, on average, gives birth to 1.6 children in her lifetime. That is well below replacement level, so the population will in time shrink unless immigration is vigorously promoted. Reduction in family size was achieved through education and the perceived economic benefits of smaller families, the same way it was reduced in Europe and Japan . This got started in the 1960s.

Wealth distribution in Thailand is no more extreme than in most industrialised countries. The poorest 10% of the people of Thailand own 2.6% of the nation's wealth. The richest 10% own 33.7%. In the U.S. , the comparable figures are 2% and 30%, in the U.K. 2.1% and 28.5%. These statistics may not be wholly reliable, but distribution of wealth is unquestionably much more equitable than in China , India , Brazil or South Africa . Even isolated Thai villages, especially in the central plains, would seem very prosperous to rural Pakistanis and positively utopian to most Nigerians. Thaksin's much-vaunted "village revolving development funds" financing local enterprise had their antecedents in the 1970s. 

All main roads in Thailand are paved (close to First-World standards), and most secondary roads are surfaced, as are a good many of the tracks that lead into remote villages, even in the poorer north and northeast parts of the country. It was like this when Thaksin was still a bankrupt ex-cop.

There are slums in Bangkok , but you have to go out of your way to find them. Since almost everyone is employed, squatters on state land in the cities often live there by choice because it is rent-free. You certainly do not have to go out of your way to see red-light districts. Incomes from the sex industry (obviously denied to those lacking looks and personally) exceed factory wages fivefold or more. The blind and maimed can apply for state aid, but street begging is often more lucrative. One sets one's own moral priorities.

There was care at government hospitals and health clinics long before Thaksin came along with his fancy $1 scheme. Treatment is not world-class but it is medical care nonetheless. People in need of operations get them for small fees, and if they have no money the charge is written off. No one is turned away from emergency rooms at government hospitals. Doctors who went through medical school on state scholarships owe as many years of modestly paid service in rural hospitals as they had in tuition.

Almost no Thais are unable read & write. Girls on average get 14 years of schooling and boys 13 years (note that girls are ahead). About 1.75 million post-secondary students (over 20% of their age group) are enrolled in universities (ranging from world-class to barely respectable), two-year colleges or vocational schools. Bright kids from poor families get government scholarships, so up-by-the-bootstraps success stories are so common as to be unremarkable. This high rate of upward social mobility goes back at least half a century.

Infant deaths per 1,000 live births in Thailand tallies 17, compared with 180 in Angola, 153 in Afghanistan and 6 in the U.S.  Li fe-expectancy at birth is 73.1 years (78.1 in the U.S., 66.1 in Russia). HIV-positive people make up 1.4% of Thailand 's population (0.6% in the U.S. )

With a population of 66 million, Thailand has 62 million registered cellphones and 7 million landlines. Service is as reliable as it is in Europe. One-fourth of the people regularly use the Internet. Thaksin's own company, which prospered prodigiously while he was prime minister, had one-third of the nation's mobile-phone customers. He sold the firm to an investment arm of the Singapore government (and paid no income tax).

Thailand routinely exports more than it imports. It is attractive for foreign direct investment. It therefore has enormous foreign reserves, and even though the country has few natural resources to sell abroad, its reserves, at $138 billion, are the 10th highest in the world. ( Britain has $56 billion, Australia $45 billion). This means plenty of capital for employment-creating new manufacturing jobs, which entice rural folk seeking work in cities. The Thai currency is so strong that even recent political troubles have not budged it.

Contrary to a widespread perception, the country's main exports are not agricultural products, but cars & trucks, motorcycles & vehicle parts (made by foreign-owned subsidiary companies). Exported pick-up trucks, the biggest single-selling item, contain negligible imported parts. One Japanese manufacturer sources its world-wide production of one-ton pickups, including those sold in Japan , from its Thai factories. Machinery is another big export, as are components for computers and other electronic goods, textiles, garments & footwear, processed food and animal fodder. Way down the list of foreign-currency earners are rice, sugar and tourism.

Over the years the Thai government has routinely produced a trade surplus, a current-account surplus and (though not this year) a budget surplus.

Since 1960 (when Thaksin was 11) no "developing" country has exceeded Thailand in average annual per-capita GDP growth. The farmers are still poor by western standards, but they've had their share of this rising affluence, and they are better off than rural folk in any other nation on earth for which we reserve the term Third World .  ?

* All statistics quoted in this article were independently cross-referenced from at least three of these sources: UNICEF, UNDP, World Bank, Asian Devt. Bank, IMF, CIA, WHO, Bank of Thailand , Thai National Statistics Office. In no case is a figure quoted from purely Thai sources. In addition, plausibility comparisons were made with the statistics of a number of other countries.

(2) Leading South Korean officials said no evidence Cheonan sunk by North

From: chris lenczner <chrispaul@netpci.com> Date: 28.05.2010 07:16 PM

The sinking of the Cheonan: Another Gulf of Tonkin incident

Stephen Gowans

http://gowans.wordpress.com/2010/05/20/the-sinking-of-the-cheonan-another-gulf-of-tonkin-

While the South Korean government announced on May 20 that it has overwhelming evidence that one of its warships was sunk by a torpedo fired by a North Korean submarine, there is, in fact, no direct link between North Korea and the sunken ship. And it seems very unlikely that North Korea had anything to do with it.

That’s not my conclusion. It’s the conclusion of Won See-hoon, director of South Korea’s National Intelligence. Won told a South Korean parliamentary committee in early April, less than two weeks after the South Korean warship, the Cheonan, sank in waters off Baengnyeong Island, that there was no evidence linking North Korea to the Cheonan’s sinking. (1)

South Korea’s Defense Minister Kim Tae-young backed him up, pointing out that the Cheonan’s crew had not detected a torpedo (2), while Lee Ki-sik, head of the marine operations office at the South Korean joint chiefs of staff agreed that “No North Korean warships have been detected…(in) the waters where the accident took place.” (3)

Notice he said “accident.”

Soon after the sinking of the South Korean warship, the Cheonan, Defense Minister Kim Tae-young ruled out a North Korean torpedo attack, noting that a torpedo would have been spotted, and no torpedo had been spotted. Intelligence chief Won See-hoon, said there was no evidence linking North Korea to the Cheonan’s sinking.

Defense Ministry officials added that they had not detected any North Korean submarines in the area at the time of the incident. (4) According to Lee, “We didn’t detect any movement by North Korean submarines near” the area where the Cheonan went down. (5)

When speculation persisted that the Cheonan had been sunk by a North Korean torpedo, the Defense Ministry called another press conference to reiterate “there was no unusual North Korean activities detected at the time of the disaster.” (6)

A ministry spokesman, Won Tae-jae, told reporters that “With regard to this case, no particular activities by North Korean submarines or semi-submarines…have been verified. I am saying again that there were no activities that could be directly linked to” the Cheonan’s sinking. (7)

Rear Admiral Lee, the head of the marine operations office, added that, “We closely watched the movement of the North’s vessels, including submarines and semi-submersibles, at the time of the sinking. But military did not detect any North Korean submarines near the country’s western sea border.” (8)

North Korea has vehemently denied any involvement in the sinking.

So, a North Korean submarine is now said to have fired a torpedo which sank the Cheonan, but in the immediate aftermath of the sinking the South Korean navy detected no North Korean naval vessels, including submarines, in the area. Indeed, immediately following the incident defense minister Lee ruled out a North Korean torpedo attack, noting that a torpedo would have been spotted, and no torpedo had been spotted. (9)

The case gets weaker still.

It’s unlikely that a single torpedo could split a 1,200 ton warship in two. Baek Seung-joo, an analyst with the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis says that “If a single torpedo or floating mine causes a naval patrol vessel to split in half and sink, we will have to rewrite our military doctrine.” (10)

The Cheonan sank in shallow, rapidly running, waters, in which it’s virtually impossible for submarines to operate. “Some people are pointing the finger at North Korea,” notes Song Young-moo, a former South Korean navy chief of staff, “but anyone with knowledge about the waters where the shipwreck occurred would not draw that conclusion so easily.” (11)

Contrary to what looks like an improbable North-Korea-torpedo-hypothesis, the evidence points to the Cheonan splitting in two and sinking because it ran aground upon a reef, a real possibility given the shallow waters in which the warship was operating. According to Go Yeong-jae, the South Korean Coast Guard captain who rescued 56 of the stricken warship’s crew, he “received an order …that a naval patrol vessel had run aground in the waters 1.2 miles to the southwest of Baengnyeong Island, and that we were to move there quickly to rescue them.” (12)

So how is it that what looked like no North Korean involvement in the Cheonan’s sinking, according to the South Korean military in the days immediately following the incident, has now become, one and half months later, an open and shut case of North Korean aggression, according to government-appointed investigators?

South Korean president Lee Myung-bak is a North Korea-phobe who prefers a confrontational stance toward his neighbor to the north to the policy of peaceful coexistence and growing cooperation favored by his recent predecessors. His foreign policy rests on the goal of forcing the collapse of North Korea.

The answer has much to do with the electoral fortunes of South Korea’s ruling Grand National Party, and the party’s need to marshal support for a tougher stance on the North. Lurking in the wings are US arms manufacturers who stand to profit if South Korean president Lee Myung-bak wins public backing for beefed up spending on sonar equipment and warships to deter a North Korean threat – all the more likely with the Cheonan incident chalked up to North Korean aggression.

Lee is a North Korea-phobe who prefers a confrontational stance toward his neighbor to the north to the policy of peaceful coexistence and growing cooperation favored by his recent predecessors (and by Pyongyang, as well. It’s worth mentioning that North Korea supports a policy of peace and cooperation. South Korea, under its hawkish president, does not.) Fabricating a case against the North serves Lee in a number of ways. If voters in the South can be persuaded that the North is indeed a menace – and it looks like this is exactly what is happening – Lee’s hawkish policies will be embraced as the right ones for present circumstances. This will prove immeasurably helpful in upcoming mayoral and gubernatorial elections in June.

What’s more, Lee’s foreign policy rests on the goal of forcing the collapse of North Korea. When he took office in February 2008, he set about reversing a 10-year-old policy of unconditional aid to the North. He has also refused to move ahead on cross-border economic projects. (13) The claim that the sinking of the Cheonan is due to an unprovoked North Korean torpedo attack makes it easier for Lee to drum up support for his confrontational stance.

Finally, the RAND Corporation is urging South Korea to buy sensors to detect North Korean submarines and more warships to intercept North Korean naval vessels. (14) An unequivocal US-lackey – protesters have called the security perimeter around Lee’s office “the U.S. state of South Korea” (15) – Lee would be pleased to hand US corporations fat contracts to furnish the South Korean military with more hardware.

The United States, too, has motivations to fabricate a case against North Korea. One is to justify the continued presence, 65 years after the end of WWII, of US troops on Japanese soil. Many Japanese bristle at what is effectively a permanent occupation of their country by more than a token contingent of US troops. There are 60,000 US soldiers, airmen and sailors in Japan. Washington, and the Japanese government – which, when it isn’t willingly collaborating with its own occupiers, is forced into submission by the considerable leverage Washington exercises — justifies the US troop presence through the sheer sophistry of presenting North Korea as an ongoing threat. The claim that North Korea sunk the Cheonan in an unprovoked attack strengthens Washington’s case for occupation. Not surprisingly, US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton has seized on the Cheonan incident to underline “the importance of the America-Japanese alliance, and the presence of American troops on Japanese soil.” (16)

Given these political realities, it comes as no surprise that from the start members of Lee’s party blamed the sinking of the Cheonan on a North Korean torpedo, (17) just as members of the Bush administration immediately blamed 9/11 on Saddam Hussein, and then proceeded to look for evidence to substantiate their case, in the hopes of justifying an already planned invasion. (Later, the Bush administration fabricated an intelligence dossier on Iraq’s banned weapons.) In fact, the reason the ministry of defense felt the need to reiterate there was no evidence of a North Korean link was the persistent speculation of GNP politicians that North Korea was the culprit. Lee himself, ever hostile to his northern neighbor, said his “intuition” told him that North Korea was to blame. (18) Today, opposition parties accuse Lee of using “red scare” tactics to garner support as the June 2 elections draw near. (19) And leaders of South Korea’s four main opposition parties, as well as a number of civil groups, have issued a joint statement denouncing the government’s findings as untrustworthy. Woo Sang-ho, a spokesman for South Korea’s Democratic Party has called the probe results “insufficient proof and questioned whether the North was involved at all.” (20)

Lee announced, even before the inquiry rendered its findings, that a task force will be launched to overhaul the national security system and bulk up the military to prepare itself for threats from North Korea. (21) He even prepared a package of sanctions against the North in the event the inquiry confirmed what his intuition told him. (22) No wonder civil society groups denounced the inquiry’s findings, arguing that “The probe started after the conclusions had already been drawn.” (23)

Jung Sung-ki, a staff reporter for The Korean Times, has raised a number of questions about the inquiry’s findings. The inquiry concluded that “two North Korean submarines, one 300-ton Sango class and the other 130-ton Yeono class, were involved in the attack. Under the cover of the Sango class, the midget Yeono class submarine approached the Cheonan and launched the CHT-02D torpedo manufactured by North Korea.” But “’Sango class submarines…do not have an advanced system to guide homing weapons,’ an expert at a missile manufacturer told The Korea Times on condition of anonymity. ‘If a smaller class submarine was involved, there is a bigger question mark.’” (24)

“Rear Adm. Moon Byung-ok, spokesman for [the official inquiry] told reporters, ‘We confirmed that two submarines left their base two or three days prior to the attack and returned to the port two or three days after the assault.’” But earlier “South Korean and U.S. military authorities confirmed several times that there had been no sign of North Korean infiltration in the” area in which the Cheonan went down. (25)

“In addition, Moon’s team reversed its position on whether or not there was a column of water following an air bubble effect” (caused by an underwater explosion.) “Earlier, the team said there were no sailors who had witnessed a column of water. But during [a] briefing session, the team said a soldier onshore at Baengnyeong Island witnessed ‘an approximately 100-meter-high pillar of white,’ adding that the phenomenon was consistent with a shockwave and bubble effect.” (26)

The inquiry produced a torpedo propeller recovered by fishing vessels that it said perfectly match the schematics of a North Korean torpedo. “But it seemed that the collected parts had been corroding at least for several months.” (27)

Finally, the investigators “claim the Korean word written on the driving shaft of the propeller parts was same as that seen on a North Korean torpedo discovered by the South …seven years ago.” But the “’word is not inscribed on the part but written on it,’ an analyst said, adding that “’the lettering issue is dubious.’” (28)

On August 2, 1964, the United States announced that three North Vietnamese torpedo boats had launched an unprovoked attacked on the USS Maddox, a US Navy destroyer, in the Gulf of Tonkin. The incident handed US president Lyndon Johnson the Congressional support he needed to step up military intervention in Vietnam. In 1971, the New York Times reported that the Pentagon Papers, a secret Pentagon report, revealed that the incident had been faked to provide a pretext for escalated military intervention. There had been no attack.

The Cheonan incident has all the markings of another Gulf of Tonkin incident. And as usual, the aggressor is accusing the intended victim of an unprovoked attack to justify a policy of aggression under the pretext of self-defense.

1. Kang Hyun-kyung, “Ruling camp differs over NK involvement in disaster”, The Korea Times, April 7, 2010.
2. Nicole Finnemann, “The sinking of the Cheonan”, Korea Economic Institute, April 1, 2010. http://newsmanager.commpartners.com/kei/issues/2010-04-01/1.html
3. “Military leadership adding to Cheonan chaos with contradictory statements”, The Hankyoreh, March 31, 2010.
4. “Birds or North Korean midget submarine?” The Korea Times, April 16, 2010.
5. Ibid.
6. “Military plays down N.K. foul play”, The Korea Herald, April 2, 2010.
7. Ibid.
8. “No subs near Cheonan: Ministry”, JoongAng Daily, April 2, 2010.
9. Jean H. Lee, “South Korea says mine from the North may have sunk warship”, The Washington Post, March 30, 2010.
10. “What caused the Cheonan to sink?” The Chosun Ilbo, March 29, 2010.
11. Ibid.
12. “Military leadership adding to Cheonan chaos with contradictory statements”, The Hankyoreh, March 31, 2010.
13. Blaine Harden, “Brawl Near Koreas’ Border,” The Washington Post, December 3, 2008.
14. “Kim So-hyun, “A touchstone of Lee’s leadership”, The Korea Herald, May 13, 2010.
15. The New York Times, June 12, 2008.
16. Mark Landler, “Clinton condemns attack on South Korean Ship”, The New York Times, May 21, 2010.
17. Kang Hyun-kyung, “Ruling camp differs over NK involvement in disaster”, The Korea Times, April 7, 2010.
18. “Kim So-hyun, “A touchstone of Lee’s leadership”, Korea Herald, May 13, 2010.
19. Kang Hyun-kyung, “Ruling camp differs over NK involvement in disaster”, The Korea Times, April 7, 2010; Choe Sang-Hun, “South Korean sailors say blast that sank their ship came from outside vessel”, The New York Times, April 8, 2010.
20. Cho Jae-eun, “Probe satisfies some, others have doubts”, JoongAng Daily, May 21, 2010.
21. “Kim So-hyun, “A touchstone of Lee’s leadership”, The Korea Herald, May 13, 2010.
22. “Seoul prepares sanctions over Cheonan sinking”, The Choson Ilbo, May 13, 2010.
23. Cho Jae-eun, “Probe satisfies some, others have doubts”, JoongAng Daily, May 21, 2010.
24. Jung Sung-ki, “Questions raised about ‘smoking gun’”, The Korea Times, May 20, 2010.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.

Most of the articles cited here are posted on Tim Beal’s DPRK- North Korea website, http://www.vuw.ac.nz/~caplabtb/dprk/, an invaluable resource for anyone interested in Korea.

Updated May 30, 20110.

(3) US report on Cheonan sinking made no mention of Foal Eagle war game under way; or that four Aegis warships (3 US, 1 South Korean) were participating

From: chris lenczner <chrispaul@netpci.com>  Date: 26.05.2010 07:47 PM

South Korea in the line of friendly fire

Kim Myong Chol

May 26, 2010

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/LE26Dg01.html

Editor's note: North Korean leader Kim Jong-il has ordered his million-strong armed forces to "combat readiness", according to a broadcast by the North Korean military. On Monday, South Korea announced it was suspending almost all trade links with North Korea in retaliation for the torpedoing of its warship Cheonan with the loss of 46 lives. The South has also banned all North Korean shipping from its waters and vowed to resume sensitive propaganda broadcasts across the Demilitarized Zone that were suspended in 2004.

"We do not hope for war but if South Korea, with the US and Japan on its back, tries to attack us, Kim Jong-il has ordered us to finish the task of unification left undone during the ... (Korean) war (in 1953)," the military broadcast said.]

The South Korea-led multinational investigation team of the March 26 night sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan held a news conference in Seoul on May 20 to unveil its finalized forensic report with false findings pointing a finger at North Korea.

The report has all the hallmarks of rushing to invoke an all-too-familiar North Korean bogeyman in a bid to cover up the US role in a friendly fire incident.

The May 20 report is the only visible part of the iceberg-like "proof" that the South Korean people and the world public have all been lied to.

It is safe to state that the May 20 presentation is another lie of the century, as was the February 5, 2003, speech by the then-US secretary of state Colin Powell at the United Nations.

As the Powell speech paved the way for the invasion of Iraq by the US-led "coalition of the willing", the May 20 report carries strong risks of trading charges quickly escalating into a nuclear war between two nuclear powers, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United States.

CBS News reported on May 19 a significant Iraq War-like split among multi-national investigators: "The US, Britain and Australia - all of which helped in the investigation - are all prepared to back up the findings. Only Sweden, which also sent investigators, is a reluctant partner in blaming the North Koreans."

The US, the United Kingdom and Australia were members of the "coalition of the willing", whereas Sweden deeply opposed the invasion of Iraq. A major producer of AIP submarines, Sweden has vast expertise on shallow-water submarine warfare.

The Financial Times reported on May 19 on the skeptical reaction of the South Korean people:

Nevertheless, despite what appears to be the bloodiest North Korean attack for more than two decades, there has been no outpouring of public rage against Pyongyang. The loss of the warship has also exposed South Koreans' mistrust of whatever the government says and a historic sense of fraternity with the North, feelings that can override strategic dangers.

The government seems to be hiding something. If not, why did it take so long to announce the conclusion?' said Bae Sung-hoon, a 37-year-old office worker. Many ordinary South Koreans say that their government is merely seeking a convenient scapegoat for what was a mistake on the part of the South's navy, or what was a "friendly fire" incident involving the US military.

A South Korean sister paper of the Washington Times, Segye Ilbo, on March 29 quoted a military source as saying: "The radar of the CIC on the corvette Cheonan is capable of easily detecting any torpedo within any radius of 20-30 kilometers but on that fateful day it detected no sign of a torpedo attack or naval firing by North Korea.Japan's conservative mass circulation daily Yomiuri Shimbun on March 21 quoted South Korean security experts as commenting, "Material evidence does not directly tally with the act of firing a torpedo. Absent is a perfect demonstration of the presence of a North Korean submarine and its launch of a torpedo. North Korea will likely counter-argue that South Koreans acquired a North Korean torpedo in a third country and launched it."

Too clumsy to be a compelling case

The discovery of a given suspect's weapon at the scene of crime does not establish his or her guilt because it could have been deliberately placed there by the true culprit to impute responsibility.

To establish the culpability of a suspect it is essential to satisfy at least three requirements. The first is demonstration of his or her presence at the time of the crime; corroboration of his or her actual use of the deadly weapon in question in perpetrating the crime; determination of how and why the suspect was able to get away.

As the three salient facts indicate, the final findings and accompanying pieces of evidence are so crudely crafted that they neither place North Korea at the scene of the tragedy nor establish North Korea's guilt. The reason is obvious: the Americans and the South Koreans failed to study Perry Mason and Sherlock Holmes.

Firstly, the multi-national investigation did four things:

  It identified that the cause of the sinking of the South Korean ship was a torpedo.

  It disclosed that a few small North Korean submarines were out of their home port a couple of days before and after the ship disaster.

  It produced fragments of what was purported to be a torpedo with markings in Korean scrip retrieved from the seabed.

  It speculated that the torpedo was fired by a North Korean submarine.

The investigation team did not prove at all the presence of a North Korean submarine at the scene of the sinking at the time of one of the world's greatest military exercises, as illustrated by telltale failures:

  Failure to identify the name of a suspect small, primitive museum piece-like North Korean submarine and the names of its crew. A Toyota vehicle abandoned at the scene of a terrorist attack does not mean that either Japan or Toyota Motor Corporation was responsible for the action.

  Failure to discuss the manner in which the suspected slow-moving North Korean submarine managed to penetrate South Korean waters, operate in shallow waters (depth of less than 30 meters) without being detected by the state-of-art radar and sonar-mounted US and South Korean ships and get away scot-free after the corvette sank in an explosion with a column of water so high (about 100 meters), so flashy and so noisy that a sentry on the shore of the Island of Baekryon witnessed it.

  Failure to cite one of the world's greatest war games that was going on at the scene. Yonhap reported on March 26 from Pyongtaek City on the west coast of South Korea that "The Foal/Eagle US-South Korean joint exercise is currently underway in the West Sea as US Aegis ships arrived May 25 at the Pyongtaek Naval Base where the Second Fleet is headquartered".

  Failure to discuss the presence in the war games on the fateful March 26 night of four Aegis ships, the USS Shiloh (CG-67), a 9,600-ton Ticonderoga class cruiser, the USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG-54), a 6,800-ton Arleigh Burke class guided-missile destroyer, the USS Lassen, a 9,200-ton Arleigh Burke class guided-missile destroyer and Sejong the Great, a 8,500-ton South Korean guided-missile destroyer, most probably supported by US nuclear and South Korean German Type 209 and 212 AIP submarines.

  Failure to refer to the German explosives found at the wreckage of the corvette despite an initial announcement. The Korea Times reported on May 7, "The multinational investigation team is also closely looking into the possibility that a North Korean submarine fired a German-made torpedo used both by the South Korean and American navies in an attempt to dodge its responsibility."

The Blue House (presidential house) was dismayed at the multinational investigators' May 7 announcement that they had detected German RDX in the wreckage and pressured the Defense Ministry not to accept the findings, as Yonhap reported two days later.

  Failure to explain the failure to find and retrieve two harpoon anti-ship missiles and a torpedo tube lost when the corvette sank, while succeeding in recovering the motor and propeller of the spent torpedo.

The investigation team produced what it termed "conclusive evidence": the eye-catching hand-written Korean markings "ilbon" or "No 1" in English found on the propulsion section of the used torpedo allegedly recovered from the sea bed.

This turns out to be most inconclusive and counter-productive, calling into serious question the credibility of the findings. The use of "ilbon" in Korean script - not in Chinese characters - may look like North Korean writing, which is distinctly different from what is written in South Korea.

But native North Koreans use "ilho" for the English "No 1". "Ilbon" is what South Koreans would use, although North Korean street addresses more often than often not do contain numerals like "ilbon".

A likely theory for this blunder is the sense on the part of the investigators that there was an absence of hard evidence to impress a skeptical South Korean and world audience.

Disaster overrides key US policy objectives
A key policy objective of United States President Barack Obama and South Korean President Lee Myung-bak is to bring North Korea back to the six-party talks to persuade it to give up its nuclear arsenal and prevent it from exporting weapons.

They should be well informed that the May 20 forensic report carries four serious risks in its fallout.

Risk No1: The most effective high-profile global cost-free advertisement of the high performance of inexpensive weapons produced in North Korea.

The Yomiuri Shimbun on March 21 commented: "Weapons experts observe, 'North Korean torpedoes are not less reliable than those deployed by Western countries.' For North Korea, which earns foreign currency by exporting weapons, the sinking of the corvette is a good opportunity to demonstrate the performance of its domestically produced torpedoes, increasing their value as an export item."

According to the SIPRI Yearbook 2005 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), North Korea exported 3,250 anti-tank missiles and 1,250 surface-to-air missiles(SAMs) to Russia between 1992 and 2005, and 45 Scud-C missiles (range 500km) to Yemen between 2001 and 2002.

Risk No 2: Embarrassing proof that the much-touted expensive and sophisticated US military hardware is a white elephant and that the US offer of a security guarantee to South Korea does not make any sense.

The world knows that air and sea supremacy and the presence of high-tech weapons are useless against small rag-tag insurgent forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Their one-dollar improvised explosive devices play havoc with eight-wheel armored combat vehicles, high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (Humvees) and mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles.

The net outcome will be reduced international demand for American weapons.

Risk No 3: Gone once and for all is the only small opportunity for North Korea to agree to return to the table for nuclear talks and renounce its nuclear arsenal.

Risk No 4: A sharpening of tensions on the Korean Peninsula has brought about a very explosive situation in which an armed clash may ignite hot war at any moment. The US is fighting two wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Obama administration appears to be opting for another war.

The Korean People's Army has been put on combat readiness. Supreme Commander Kim Jong-il is one click away from turning Seoul, Tokyo and New York into a sea of fire with a fleet of nuclear-tipped North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Why have the two presidents put on the back burner their shared top policy priority objectives? What consideration has overridden them?

The answer is the urgent need to keep secret from the public that the tragic sinking of the corvette was a result of inadvertent friendly fire by a US nuclear submarine or an Aegis ship or any other naval ship. (See Pyongyang sees US role in Cheonan sinking Asia Times Online, May 5, 2010. <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/LE05Dg01.html>)

Public knowledge of US friendly fire would generate a destructive bubble-jet effect of launching waves of anti-Americanism and attendant objections to US bases in South Korea, Japan and the rest of Asia, landing Obama and Lee in trouble. The latter would see his ruling party soundly defeated in June's nationwide gubernatorial and municipal elections.

There is no other plausible explanation.

Kim Myong Chol is author of a number of books and papers in Korean, Japanese and English on North Korea, including Kim Jong-il's Strategy for Reunification. He has a PhD from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Academy of Social Sciences and is often called an "unofficial" spokesman of Kim Jong-il and North Korea.

(Copyright 2010 Kim Myong Chol.)