743 Nemtsov met McFaul at US Embassy; Nemtsov adviser attended NED forums

  Nemtsov met McFaul at US Embassy; Nemtsov adviser attended NED forums

Newsletter published on 4 March 2015

(1) US-Backed Opposition Leader Boris Nemtsov gunned down in Moscow
(2) Anti-Putin Opposition hoped Sanctions-induced economic crisis would
spark Spring revolt
(3) Russian Opposition's Confab at US Embassy in 2012 to meet McFaul
(4) Yes, we Meddled in Ukraine - Michael McFaul (2004), US Ambassador to
Russia 2011-4
(5) US campaign behind the turmoil in Ukraine - The Guardian (2004)
(6) NED lists its affiliated Russia Dissidents (2011)
(7) NED lists its affiliated Russia Dissidents (2013)
(8) Institute of Modern Russia "a think tank based in New York"
(9) Arab Spring: 'A Virus that will attack Moscow and Beijing' - John
McCain (2011)

(1) US-Backed Opposition Leader Boris Nemtsov gunned down in Moscow

http://journal-neo.org/2015/02/28/russia-us-backed-opposition-leader-gunned-down-in-moscow/

  28.02.2015   Author: Tony Cartalucci

US-Backed Opposition Leader Gunned Down in Moscow

Martyrdom on demand: if not of use alive, perhaps of use dead? US-backed
opposition groups in Russia have so far failed utterly to produce
results. Their transparent subservience to Washington coupled with their
distasteful brand of politics has left a rather unpleasant taste in the
mouth of most Russians. Each attempt to spread the “virus” of color
revolution to Moscow, as US Senator John McCain called it, has failed –
and each attempt has fallen progressively flatter.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has never been more popular. His
ability to weather serial provocations aimed at Russia by NATO has made
him a champion against the perceived growing injustice exacted against
the developing world by an increasingly militaristic and exploitative West.

So when US-backed opposition groups in Russia decided to gather again
this coming March 1, Sunday, many wondered just exactly what they
expected to accomplish.

Bloomberg just a day ago, would report in an article titled, “Anti-Putin
Opposition Looks to Russian Spring for Revival,” that:

     Just before he was jailed for handing out leaflets at a metro
station, Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny used his last moments
in a Moscow court to record a video urging supporters to join a March 1
protest against President Vladimir Putin.

     Navalny’s removal from the “Spring” rally by a 15-day sentence
underlined the beleaguered state of an opposition movement that brought
100,000 onto Moscow’s streets three years ago as well as the Kremlin’s
unease about the potential for unrest in Russia.

     Squeezed by government persecution and Putin’s near-record approval
rating, Russia’s opposition is betting that an unfolding economic crisis
will spark a spring revolt on a scale last seen at the winter protests
of 2011-2012, the largest since the collapse of Communism 20 years
earlier. It seeks to draw as many as 100,000 people to the “anti-crisis
march” in Moscow, with protests also planned in 15 other cities. They’ll
highlight declining living standards and the conflict in eastern Ukraine
that triggered U.S. and European Union sanctions against Russia.

The article however, also stated that:

     The opposition “hasn’t been this weak for many years,” Stefan
Meister, an analyst at the German Council of Foreign Relations in
Berlin, said by phone. “Even when we have a growing economic crisis in
Russia, there’s still high support for Putin.”

Clearly to match the expectations the “spring” rally was meant to have,
to infuse the “virus” US Senator McCain had claimed was intended for
Moscow, something drastic would have to be done to change the current
calculus.

The prospect of triggering sustainable unrest aimed at the Kremlin was
beyond impossible – that is – until the leader of the planned protest
was shot dead, practically on the steps of the Kremlin itself in the
heart of Moscow.

Boris Nemtsov, was reportedly shot four times in the back on Friday
night in a drive-by shooting. His body laid conveniently for media
photographers to capture the Kremlin looming in the background.

Russia immediately condemned the killing, with President Putin noting it
was an act of “pure provocation.”

Nemtsov’s Questionable Ties to US Agitators

Nemtsov had led US-backed opposition protests for years. In 2012, he was
caught literally walking into the US Embassy in Moscow to meet with then
newly appointed US Ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul who had serve on
the board of directors of Freedom House and the National Endowment for
Democracy (NED).

The significance of this cannot be overstated.

It was in 2004, when Michael McFaul would write in the Washington Post
in an op-ed titled, “‘Meddling’ In Ukraine Democracy is not an American
plot,” that:

     Did Americans meddle in the internal affairs of Ukraine? Yes. The
American agents of influence would prefer different language to describe
their activities — democratic assistance, democracy promotion, civil
society support, etc. — but their work, however labeled, seeks to
influence political change in Ukraine. The U.S. Agency for International
Development, the National Endowment for Democracy and a few other
foundations sponsored certain U.S. organizations, including Freedom
House, the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic
Institute, the Solidarity Center, the Eurasia Foundation, Internews and
several others to provide small grants and technical assistance to
Ukrainian civil society. The European Union, individual European
countries and the Soros-funded International Renaissance Foundation did
the same.

Added to McFaul’s confession, are similar reports such as the Guardian’s
2004 article titled, “US campaign behind the turmoil in Kiev,” which
reported:

     But while the gains of the orange-bedecked “chestnut revolution”
are Ukraine’s, the campaign is an American creation, a sophisticated and
brilliantly conceived exercise in western branding and mass marketing
that, in four countries in four years, has been used to try to salvage
rigged elections and topple unsavoury regimes.

     Funded and organised by the US government, deploying US
consultancies, pollsters, diplomats, the two big American parties and US
non-government organisations, the campaign was first used in Europe in
Belgrade in 2000 to beat Slobodan Milosevic at the ballot box.

     Richard Miles, the US ambassador in Belgrade, played a key role.
And by last year, as US ambassador in Tbilisi, he repeated the trick in
Georgia, coaching Mikhail Saakashvili in how to bring down Eduard
Shevardnadze.

     Ten months after the success in Belgrade, the US ambassador in
Minsk, Michael Kozak, a veteran of similar operations in central
America, notably in Nicaragua, organised a near identical campaign to
try to defeat the Belarus hardman, Alexander Lukashenko.

     That one failed. “There will be no Kostunica in Belarus,” the
Belarus president declared, referring to the victory in Belgrade.

     But experience gained in Serbia, Georgia and Belarus has been
invaluable in plotting to beat the regime of Leonid Kuchma in Kiev.

     The operation – engineering democracy through the ballot box and
civil disobedience – is now so slick that the methods have matured into
a template for winning other people’s elections.

It is important to understand what the US did in Ukraine, Serbia,
Georgia, Belarus, and Nicaragua, and who was involved, because that is
precisely what the US repeated in 2011 amid the so-called “Arab Spring,”
and again in 2013-2014 during the so-called “Euromaidan,” and precisely
what they are attempting to do in Russia itself today.

That Nemtsov was meeting directly with McFaul who openly works to
subvert governments to suit special interests in Washington and on Wall
Street, gives some indication of just how closely tied to US meddling
Nemtsov was.

In addition to Nemtsov’s direct contact with representatives of
US-backed sedition, Nemtsov’s adviser, Vladimir Kara-Murza, has attended
NED forums including one in 2011 titled, “Elections in Russia: Polling
and Perspectives,” and an NED forum in 2013 titled, “Russia: A
Postmodern Dictatorship?” which was jointly presented by Kara-Murza’s
“Institute ofModern Russia,” a joint-US Neo-Con/US-backed Russian
opposition propaganda clearing house.

The height of US-backed regime change appeared to be the so-called “Arab
Spring.” The Atlantic in an article titled, “The Arab Spring: ‘A Virus
That Will Attack Moscow and Beijing’,” would state:

     [US Senator John McCain] said, “A year ago, Ben-Ali and Gaddafi
were not in power. Assad won’t be in power this time next year. This
Arab Spring is a virus that will attack Moscow and Beijing.” McCain then
walked off the stage.

     Comparing the Arab Spring to a virus is not new for the Senator —
but to my knowledge, coupling Russia and China to the comment is.

     Senator McCain’s framing reflects a triumphalism bouncing around at
this conference. It sees the Arab Spring as a product of Western design
— and potentially as a tool to take on other non-democratic governments.

     At an earlier session, Senator Udall said that those who believed
that the Arab Spring was an organic revolution from within these
countries were wrong — and that the West and NATO in particular had been
primary drivers of results in Libya — and that the West had helped
animate and move affairs in Egypt. Udall provocatively added Syria to
that list as well.

“This virus” may have overwhelmed governments around the world at first,
but since then, success has been limited with major setbacks in
Thailand, Malaysia, and even in Egypt where US-backed regimes were
either ousted by military coups, or never made it into power to begin
with. Ukraine’s “Euromaidan,” while successful in Kiev, has led to
Crimea’s return to Russia and a bitter civil war in the country’s
eastern most provinces that have drained the lifeblood from Washington’s
newly acquired client state.

It was clear that Washington’s “template” needed an upgrade. What could
be done, just days ahead of another attempt to trigger sustainable
unrest in Moscow? What could the movement use? A martyr.

Nemtsov, A Convenient Martyr… Too Convenient

The provocative murder in the center of Moscow, in close proximity to
the Kremlin itself, would lead the more gullible members of the general
public to imagine President Putin himself leaning back in his office
chair with a rifle sticking out the window of the Kremlin, and gunning
down his rival – in true super villain form.

Already, before any investigation has been conducted, Western news
sources are attempting to imply the Kremlin was behind his murder –
hoping the general public believes Russia’s leadership would be careless
and thoughtless enough to commit such a provocative act just two days
ahead of protests.

The BBC in its report, “Russia opposition politician Boris Nemtsov shot
dead,” would claim:

     He died hours after appealing for support for a march on Sunday in
Moscow against the war in Ukraine.

     Russian President Vladimir Putin has condemned the murder, the
Kremlin says.

     In a recent interview, Mr Nemtsov had said he feared Mr Putin would
have him killed because of his opposition to the war in Ukraine.

Of course, the BBC also mentioned Nemtsov’s intentions of exploiting
growing economic concerns in Russia, brought on entirely by sanctions
placed on Russia by the United States and its allies regarding chaos
admittedly caused by overt, admitted US meddling in Ukraine’s internal
affairs.

It appears likely that rather than the Kremlin clumsily killing an
opponent on their doorstep on the eve of  a major protest, he was
instead killed by either members of his own opposition movement, or by
his US backers themselves. The combination of economic strain brought on
by US sanctions, US-backed mobs planning to take to the streets, and now
a martyr conventionality delivered just 2 days before the protest he was
meant to lead was to take place, has the deck stacked with the most
favorable cards to deliver the West the sort of sustainable chaos and
unrest it has desired to create in Russia, and has admittedly created in
neighboring Ukraine, according to America’s own former Ambassador to
Russia, Michael McFaul.

A Message to America’s Proxies – Be Useful Alive, or Be Useful Dead

What must be going through the minds of Nemtsov’s colleagues who will
undoubtedly repeat the West’s propaganda implying the Kremlin was behind
his murder, but who know the Kremlin well enough to know that isn’t true?

They must now realize that any one of them could be next – that if their
utility to their foreign sponsors alive is outweighed by their utility
to them dead, they may be in tomorrow’s headlines for all the wrong
reasons. Their options are limited – continuing as pawns of an
increasingly violent, dangerous, and unstable collection of foreign
interests or divesting from their roles as foreign-sponsored agitators,
and reapproaching Russian politics in a more honest and constructive
manner, even if their capacity remains in opposition to the current
government – albeit in a diminished role lacking the resources
Washington has lavished upon them.

To America’s proxies beyond Russia’s borders, they too must understand
that the days of “color revolutions” sweeping targeted governments from
power are over and that their lives are equally in danger of being spent
for the cause of “martyrdom” to supercharge their floundering opposition
movements.

Regarding Nemtsov’s murder, any good investigator would be tasked with
the question, “to whose benefit?” Surely it would benefit the Kremlin to
rid themselves of an opponents, but not in this manner. In fact, the
only party that stood to benefit from his high-profile execution in the
streets of Moscow were his own compatriots and his foreign backers who
faced the prospect of yet another failed protest. Sympathy, they hope,
will spur Russians who are on the fence politically to take to the
streets, joining others who may have previously avoided protests because
of Russia’s economic strength before US sanctions sank in.

The opposition, if they were not behind the murder of one of their own
leaders, would not dare hold the protest this week – as it would be a
shameless exploitation of this tragedy – and they would instead, for
both security and respect, mourn the loss of Nemtsov thoughtfully.
However, since they and their foreign backers were undoubtedly behind
the murder, they will protest, shamelessly leveraging Nemtsov’s death to
its fullest – using mourners to bolster their ranks.

When US Senator John McCain called America’s meddling abroad a “virus,”
he meant it. It truly is a disease. And if Russians allow it to, it will
corrupt and consume their entire nation just as it has corrupted and
consumed the opposition planning to march.

Tony Cartalucci, Bangkok-based geopolitical researcher and writer,
especially for the online magazine“New Eastern Outlook”.

(2) Anti-Putin Opposition hoped Sanctions-induced economic crisis would
spark Spring revolt
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-26/anti-putin-opposition-looks-to-russian-spring-for-revival

Anti-Putin Opposition Looks to Russian Spring for Revival

by Jake Rudnitsky Milda Seputyte Stepan Kravchenko

February 26, 2015

(Bloomberg) -- Just before he was jailed for handing out leaflets at a
metro station, Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny used his last
moments in a Moscow court to record a video urging supporters to join a
March 1 protest against President Vladimir Putin.

Navalny’s removal from the “Spring” rally by a 15-day sentence
underlined the beleaguered state of an opposition movement that brought
100,000 onto Moscow’s streets three years ago as well as the Kremlin’s
unease about the potential for unrest in Russia.

“The current regime, after years of eating through the oil money, has
brought the country to a dead-end and is completely bankrupt,” protest
organizers, who include Navalny and former Yukos Oil Co. chief Mikhail
Khodorkovsky, said in a website appeal to supporters. “Putin and his
government can’t lead the country out of the crisis and must go.”

Squeezed by government persecution and Putin’s near-record approval
rating, Russia’s opposition is betting that an unfolding economic crisis
will spark a spring revolt on a scale last seen at the winter protests
of 2011-2012, the largest since the collapse of Communism 20 years
earlier. It seeks to draw as many as 100,000 people to the “anti-crisis
march” in Moscow, with protests also planned in 15 other cities. They’ll
highlight declining living standards and the conflict in eastern Ukraine
that triggered U.S. and European Union sanctions against Russia. Protest
‘Energy’

“I think the energy that is hidden in the masses can start unleashing
now for many reasons,” Sergei Parkhomenko, a publisher and activist who
was prominent in the 2011-2012 protests, said by phone. “I will go
because of the war Russia is waging in Ukraine, somebody will go because
Russia lost any economic prospects, others will join because their
consumption habits are affected.”

The opposition “hasn’t been this weak for many years,” Stefan Meister,
an analyst at the German Council of Foreign Relations in Berlin, said by
phone. “Even when we have a growing economic crisis in Russia, there’s
still high support for Putin.”

The 2011-12 protests catapulted Navalny to the head of a movement driven
by anger at alleged ballot fraud in parliamentary elections and
discontent over Putin’s return for a third presidential term in 2012.

Navalny’s arrest was upheld by a Moscow city court Friday, Tass
reported, citing the ruling. He was detained Feb. 15 for recruiting for
Sunday’s rally before it had been officially approved and jailed Feb. 20.

Patriotic Support

Buoyed by a wave of patriotism after Russia’s annexation of Crimea from
Ukraine last March, Putin now enjoys 86 percent support, according to a
survey published Thursday of 1,600 people from Feb. 20-23 by the
Moscow-based pollster Levada Center. It placed the president just below
October’s record-matching 88 percent and well above his 69 percent
rating before the Black Sea peninsula was taken.

“The patriotic ‘Crimea’ mobilization still is present,” though polls can
be “deceitful,” Lilia Shevtsova, senior fellow at the Brookings
Institution, said from Moscow by e-mail. “The Communist party in Russia
unraveled when the polls still showed 99.9 percent approval.”

Russians are nervous about the economic crisis, a survey by state
pollster VTsIOM showed last week. One in three expects wage cuts to
reduce their family’s income in the next three months and a quarter
fears they or family members will lose their jobs, according to the Jan.
31-Feb. 1 poll of 1,600 people. It had a margin of error of 3.5
percentage points.

Wage Cuts

Real wages fell in January by the most since 1999 and retail sales fell
for the first time in more than five years, according to the Federal
Statistics Service, as tumbling oil prices help push the economy of the
world’s largest energy exporter toward recession. The fastest inflation
rate in almost seven years, reaching 15 percent in January, and the
ruble’s 46 percent slump against the dollar in 2014 eroded workers’
earnings, putting Russia on track for the biggest drop in consumption in
more than two decades.

The opposition’s failure to gain traction in Kaluga, a region bordering
Moscow that faces a slowdown in its flagship auto industry, exemplifies
its lack of appeal for many Russians despite the country’s economic
woes. The local Volvo AB plant said this month it will halt production
and cut its workforce by 30 percent, while Volkswagen AG and PSA Peugeot
Citroen factories have idled at times this year as Russian carmakers
brace for a 24 percent decline in 2015 sales.

Jobs, Politics

“I hope for the best and expect the worst,” said Oleg Absalyamov, who
works at the Peugeot plant on a six-month contract that expires March
31. “It all depends on the market, but I don’t think a revolution would
boost car sales.”

Workers are focusing on their job prospects rather than on politics and
are reluctant to take action, said Anatoly Demidov, a union leader at
the Volkswagen plant.

“I’m on a forced vacation,” Vladimir Sorokin, a Peugeot line worker,
said after the company halted production from Feb. 23 to March 9 for
what it says is a scheduled technical adjustment. “Even so, I wouldn’t
waste my time going to a Moscow protest. I can’t even honestly say
there’s a difference between Navalny and Putin, not for a worker
anyway.” [...]

Rejected Demand

The location of Sunday’s march symbolizes the weakness of the anti-Putin
movement. While the opposition insisted on holding rallies in central
Moscow in 2011-2012, organizers agreed this time to move to Marino, on
the outskirts of the capital, after city officials rejected their demand
for a site close to the Kremlin.

Meanwhile, police said 35,000 marched through central Moscow at a
pro-Kremlin “Anti-Maidan” rally on Feb. 21, the anniversary of Ukrainian
President Viktor Yanukovych’s ouster in the “EuroMaidan” uprising.
Protest banners at the march, which was promoted strongly on state
television, derided Putin’s opponents as a treacherous “fifth column.”

‘Dramatic Situation’

Russia’s in a “dramatic situation” and “everything depends on how many
people will take to the streets in Moscow,” Shevtsova said. “On the one
hand, Russia is falling into economic and social crisis,” she said. “On
the other, Russian society is so demoralized and atomized that it has no
drive and energy, so far, for a strong demonstration of dissatisfaction
and anger.”

An “immediate end to the war” is among protesters’ demands, as well as
fair elections, judicial reform, access to television, and cancellation
of Russia’s ban on foods from the U.S. and the EU in retaliation for
their sanctions over Ukraine.

It’s good the opposition “are trying to show that they are still around
and that the Kremlin’s view on things including Ukraine is not the only
view,” Liik said. “But it’s not going to find very wide resonance.”

The authorities’ “moment of truth” hasn’t yet arrived, said Shevtsova.
“But there is no doubt that the protest bubbles are forming beneath the
surface. They can burst at any time.”

To contact the reporters on this story: Jake Rudnitsky in Moscow at
jrudnitsky@bloomberg.net; Milda Seputyte in Vilnius at
mseputyte@bloomberg.net; Stepan Kravchenko in Moscow at
skravchenko@bloomberg.net

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Balazs Penz at
bpenz@bloomberg.net Michael Winfrey, Torrey Clark

(3) Russian Opposition's Confab at US Embassy in 2012 to meet McFaul

http://landdestroyer.blogspot.com.au/2012/05/unbelievable-russian-oppositions-confab.html

Unbelievable: Russian Opposition's Confab at US Embassy

Russian Opposition Caught Filing into US Embassy in Moscow.

by Tony Cartalucci

{visit the link to see the video of Nemtsov and others filing into the
US Embassy}

May 7, 2012 - In mid-January 2012, just days after Michael McFaul
arrived in Moscow to begin his stint as US Ambassador to Russia, Russian
opposition leaders lined up outside the US Embassy (Russian) to meet him
in a bizarre confab that reeked of both treason and duplicity.

Images: Caught red-handed - Russia's opposition, long accused by the
Kremlin of being foreign-funded, and who have well documented ties to
the US State Department, are caught filing into the US Embassy in Moscow
in January of 2012, just days after agitator Michael McFaul began his
stint as US Ambassador to Russia. (click on image to enlarge) ....

Approached by journalists inquiring as to why they had all come to greet
the US Ambassador, their responses ranged from silence to dismissive
gibes. Later, the group of opposition leaders emerged responding only
with "?? ???," or "you’re Surkov’s propaganda," meaning the journalists
represented government efforts to undermine their work and legitimacy.
It is a common response given by Russia's opposition members when media
attempts to question them about their increasingly overt ties to Wall
Street and London.

Video: This video captured outside the US Embassy in Moscow, Russia,
shows prominent leaders of Russia's US-funded, backed, and directed
opposition attending a confab with newly appointed US Ambassador Michael
McFaul. Both the opposition leaders and McFaul himself are directly
connected to the US State Department's National Endowment for Democracy
(NED). ....

Present at the US Embassy confab were regular mainstays of the Western
media's coverage of anti-Vladimir Putin protests, including Boris
Nemtsov, Yevgeniya Chirikova of the US State Department's National
Endowment for Democracy (NED) funded "Strategy 31," Lev Ponomarev of the
NED, Ford Foundation, Open Society, and USAID-funded Moscow Helsinki
Group, and  Liliya Shibanova of NED-funded GOLOS, an allegedly
"independent" election monitoring group that served as the primary
source of accusations of voting fraud against Putin's United Russia
party. Clearly, this wasn't the first time both words and cash had been
exchanged between the Russian opposition and the US State Department,
but is perhaps the most overt example of such flagrant conspiring yet.

Image: A screenshot from NED's official website, listing GOLOS as a
recipient of NED funding, which in turn is provided by the US State
Department.  (click image to enlarge) ....

Image: A screen shot from the "Moscow Helsink Group" clearly subsidized
from abroad. The significance of this group & its affiliates leading
protests, indicates nothing less than foreign-funded sedition unfolding
in the streets of Russia. (click image to enlarge) ....

US Ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul himself, is a card carrying
member of both Freedom House and the National Endowment for Democracy
(NED), two organizations notorious for extraterritorial meddling in the
foreign affairs of sovereign nations and demonstratively funding,
supporting, and directing Russia's so-called opposition. It was
accurately predicted in October 2011's, "Agitator Nominated for Next US
“Ambassador” to Russia," that McFaul's primary goal would be to continue
with America's "disingenuous front of “resetting” with Russia, while
simultaneously subverting the Russian government with US-funded
political unrest." It appears that McFaul has begun his work in earnest.

Despite damning exposure of the Russian opposition's ties to Wall Street
and London, the Western media, even as recently as this weekend during
protests against Russian President Vladimir Putin's inauguration,
insists that such connections are the creation of Kremlin-controlled
propaganda. The Associated Press in their article titled, "Putin Returns
to Presidency in a Changed Russia," accuses Putin of portraying the
protesters as "in the pay of the Americans and intent on bringing about
a revolution that would take Russia back to the instability and
humiliations of the 1990s." AP adds, "with Kremlin-controlled television
still the main source of information for most Russians, many believed him."

In reality, Putin's assessment of the opposition is verified by the
National Endowment for Democracy's own website, the "About Us" pages of
the opposition's various websites, and confirmed by confabs conducted by
the opposition themselves with foreign interests in foreign embassies on
Russian soil. And indeed, many of those leading Russia's opposition are
members and representatives of the corrupt oligarchies that plundered
Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990's. The treason is
so overt, it begs the question as to whether the United States has
indeed become this recklessly brazen, this desperate, or playing at a
broader geopolitical gambit yet revealed.

With Russian opposition leaders on video climbing over themselves to get
into the US Embassy to confer with regime-change specialist (Russian),
US Ambassador Michael McFaul, and as their funding and affiliations
become more widely known to the public, their work and legitimacy will
be undermined by public awareness of the facts, not "Surkov’s propaganda."

(4) Yes, we Meddled in Ukraine - Michael McFaul (2004), US Ambassador to
Russia 2011-4

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A15131-2004Dec20.html

'Meddling' In Ukraine

Democracy is not an American plot.

By Michael McFaul

Tuesday, December 21, 2004; Page A25

Events in Ukraine have inspired most people living in the free world.
Ukrainian democrats stood together in the freezing cold to demand from
their government what we citizens of democracies take for granted: the
right to elect their leaders in free and fair elections. But not all
observers of Ukraine's "Orange Revolution" are so elated. Instead of
democracy's advance, some see a U.S.-funded, White House-orchestrated
conspiracy to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty, weaken Russia's sphere of
influence and expand Washington's imperial reach. These skeptics range
from presidents Vladimir Putin of Russia, Alexander Lukashenko of
Belarus and Hugo Chavez of Venezuela to Republican Rep. Ron Paul of
Texas, columnist Patrick Buchanan, and left-wingers in the Nation and
the Guardian.

This odd collection of critics is a little bit right and a whole lot wrong.

Did Americans meddle in the internal affairs of Ukraine? Yes. The
American agents of influence would prefer different language to describe
their activities -- democratic assistance, democracy promotion, civil
society support, etc. -- but their work, however labeled, seeks to
influence political change in Ukraine. The U.S. Agency for International
Development, the National Endowment for Democracy and a few other
foundations sponsored certain U.S. organizations, including Freedom
House, the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic
Institute, the Solidarity Center, the Eurasia Foundation, Internews and
several others to provide small grants and technical assistance to
Ukrainian civil society. The European Union, individual European
countries and the Soros-funded International Renaissance Foundation did
the same.

In the run-up to Ukraine's presidential vote this fall, these American
and European organizations concentrated their resources on creating
conditions for free and fair elections. Western organizations provided
training and some direct assistance to the Committee of Ukrainian
Voters, Ukraine's first-rate election-monitoring organization. Western
funders pooled resources to sponsor two exit polls. Western foundations
also provided assistance to independent media. Freedom House and others
supported Znayu and the Freedom of Choice Coalition, whose members
included the high-profile Pora student movement. And through their
conferences and publications, these American organizations supported the
flow of knowledge and contacts between Ukrainian democrats and their
counterparts in Slovakia, Croatia, Romania and Serbia. The Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe coordinated with several other
European, U.S. and Canadian organizations to organize a major
international monitoring effort of the election process. Formally, this
help was nonpartisan, because the aim was to aid the electoral process.
Yet most of these groups believed that a free and fair election would
mean victory for Viktor Yushchenko. And they were right.

Did the U.S. government fund the Yushchenko campaign directly? Not to my
knowledge. Both the International Republican Institute and the National
Democratic Institute conducted training programs for Ukrainian political
parties, some of which later joined the Yushchenko coalition. But in the
years leading up to the 2004 votes, American ambassadors in Ukraine
insisted that no U.S. government money could be provided to any
candidate. Private sources of external funding and expertise aided the
Yushchenko campaign. Likewise, U.S. and Russian public relations
consultants worked with the Yushchenko campaign, just as U.S. and
Russian public relations people were brought in to help his opponent,
Viktor Yanukovych. In future elections Ukrainian officials might enforce
more controls on foreign resources. But this kind of private, for-profit
campaign advice occurs everywhere now, and Americans no longer control
the market.

Did American money bring about the Orange Revolution? Absolutely not.
The combination of a weak, divided and corrupt ancien régime and a
united, mobilized and highly motivated opposition produced Ukraine's
democratic breakthrough. Westerners did not create or control the
Ukrainian democratic movement but rather supported its cause on the
margins. Moreover, democracy promotion groups do not have a recipe for
revolution. If the domestic conditions aren't ripe, there will be no
democratic breakthrough, no matter how crafted the technical assistance
or how strategically invested the small grants. In fact, Western
democracy promoters work in most developing democracies in the world,
yet democratic transitions are rare.

Do these American democracy assistance groups carry out the will of the
Bush administration? Not really. One of the greatest myths about U.S.
democracy efforts is that a senior White House official carefully
choreographs the efforts of the National Endowment for Democracy or
Freedom House. While they are perhaps supportive philosophically,
policymakers at the White House and the State Department have had almost
nothing to do with the design or implementation of American democracy
assistance programs. In some countries, they clash with one another. I
witnessed this as the National Democratic Institute's representative in
Moscow during the last days of the Soviet Union: "They" -- the U.S.
policymakers -- supported Mikhail Gorbachev; "we" worked with Democratic
Russia, Gorbachev's opponents. The same divide is present in many
countries today.

Does this kind of intervention violate international norms? Not anymore.
There was a time when championing state sovereignty was a progressive
idea, since the advance of statehood helped destroy empires. But today
those who revere the sovereignty of the state above all else often do so
to preserve autocracy, while those who champion the sovereignty of the
people are the new progressives. In Ukraine, external actors who helped
the people be heard were not violating the sovereignty of the Ukrainian
people; they were defending it.

The writer is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and an associate
professor of political science at Stanford University.

(5) US campaign behind the turmoil in Ukraine - The Guardian (2004)

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/nov/26/ukraine.usa

US campaign behind the turmoil in Kiev

Ian Traynor

Friday 26 November 2004 11.03 AEDT Last modified on Wednesday 1 October
2014 18.40 AEST

With their websites and stickers, their pranks and slogans aimed at
banishing widespread fear of a corrupt regime, the democracy guerrillas
of the Ukrainian Pora youth movement have already notched up a famous
victory - whatever the outcome of the dangerous stand-off in Kiev.

Ukraine, traditionally passive in its politics, has been mobilised by
the young democracy activists and will never be the same again.

But while the gains of the orange-bedecked "chestnut revolution" are
Ukraine's, the campaign is an American creation, a sophisticated and
brilliantly conceived exercise in western branding and mass marketing
that, in four countries in four years, has been used to try to salvage
rigged elections and topple unsavoury regimes.

Funded and organised by the US government, deploying US consultancies,
pollsters, diplomats, the two big American parties and US non-government
organisations, the campaign was first used in Europe in Belgrade in 2000
to beat Slobodan Milosevic at the ballot box.

Richard Miles, the US ambassador in Belgrade, played a key role. And by
last year, as US ambassador in Tbilisi, he repeated the trick in
Georgia, coaching Mikhail Saakashvili in how to bring down Eduard
Shevardnadze.

Ten months after the success in Belgrade, the US ambassador in Minsk,
Michael Kozak, a veteran of similar operations in central America,
notably in Nicaragua, organised a near identical campaign to try to
defeat the Belarus hardman, Alexander Lukashenko.

That one failed. "There will be no Kostunica in Belarus," the Belarus
president declared, referring to the victory in Belgrade.

But experience gained in Serbia, Georgia and Belarus has been invaluable
in plotting to beat the regime of Leonid Kuchma in Kiev.

The operation - engineering democracy through the ballot box and civil
disobedience - is now so slick that the methods have matured into a
template for winning other people's elections.

In the centre of Belgrade, there is a dingy office staffed by
computer-literate youngsters who call themselves the Centre for
Non-violent Resistance. If you want to know how to beat a regime that
controls the mass media, the judges, the courts, the security apparatus
and the voting stations, the young Belgrade activists are for hire.

They emerged from the anti-Milosevic student movement, Otpor, meaning
resistance. The catchy, single-word branding is important. In Georgia
last year, the parallel student movement was Khmara. In Belarus, it was
Zubr. In Ukraine, it is Pora, meaning high time. Otpor also had a
potent, simple slogan that appeared everywhere in Serbia in 2000 - the
two words "gotov je", meaning "he's finished", a reference to Milosevic.
A logo of a black-and-white clenched fist completed the masterful marketing.

In Ukraine, the equivalent is a ticking clock, also signalling that the
Kuchma regime's days are numbered.

Stickers, spray paint and websites are the young activists' weapons.
Irony and street comedy mocking the regime have been hugely successful
in puncturing public fear and enraging the powerful.

Last year, before becoming president in Georgia, the US-educated Mr
Saakashvili travelled from Tbilisi to Belgrade to be coached in the
techniques of mass defiance. In Belarus, the US embassy organised the
dispatch of young opposition leaders to the Baltic, where they met up
with Serbs travelling from Belgrade. In Serbia's case, given the hostile
environment in Belgrade, the Americans organised the overthrow from
neighbouring Hungary - Budapest and Szeged.

In recent weeks, several Serbs travelled to the Ukraine. Indeed, one of
the leaders from Belgrade, Aleksandar Maric, was turned away at the border.

The Democratic party's National Democratic Institute, the Republican
party's International Republican Institute, the US state department and
USAid are the main agencies involved in these grassroots campaigns as
well as the Freedom House NGO and billionaire George Soros's open
society institute.

US pollsters and professional consultants are hired to organise focus
groups and use psephological data to plot strategy.

The usually fractious oppositions have to be united behind a single
candidate if there is to be any chance of unseating the regime. That
leader is selected on pragmatic and objective grounds, even if he or she
is anti-American.

In Serbia, US pollsters Penn, Schoen and Berland Associates discovered
that the assassinated pro-western opposition leader, Zoran Djindjic, was
reviled at home and had no chance of beating Milosevic fairly in an
election. He was persuaded to take a back seat to the anti-western
Vojislav Kostunica, who is now Serbian prime minister.

In Belarus, US officials ordered opposition parties to unite behind the
dour, elderly trade unionist, Vladimir Goncharik, because he appealed to
much of the Lukashenko constituency.

Officially, the US government spent $41m (£21.7m) organising and funding
the year-long operation to get rid of Milosevic from October 1999. In
Ukraine, the figure is said to be around $14m.

Apart from the student movement and the united opposition, the other key
element in the democracy template is what is known as the "parallel vote
tabulation", a counter to the election-rigging tricks beloved of
disreputable regimes.

There are professional outside election monitors from bodies such as the
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, but the Ukrainian
poll, like its predecessors, also featured thousands of local election
monitors trained and paid by western groups.

Freedom House and the Democratic party's NDI helped fund and organise
the "largest civil regional election monitoring effort" in Ukraine,
involving more than 1,000 trained observers. They also organised exit
polls. On Sunday night those polls gave Mr Yushchenko an 11-point lead
and set the agenda for much of what has followed.

The exit polls are seen as critical because they seize the initiative in
the propaganda battle with the regime, invariably appearing first,
receiving wide media coverage and putting the onus on the authorities to
respond.

The final stage in the US template concerns how to react when the
incumbent tries to steal a lost election.

In Belarus, President Lukashenko won, so the response was minimal. In
Belgrade, Tbilisi, and now Kiev, where the authorities initially tried
to cling to power, the advice was to stay cool but determined and to
organise mass displays of civil disobedience, which must remain peaceful
but risk provoking the regime into violent suppression.

If the events in Kiev vindicate the US in its strategies for helping
other people win elections and take power from anti-democratic regimes,
it is certain to try to repeat the exercise elsewhere in the post-Soviet
world.

The places to watch are Moldova and the authoritarian countries of
central Asia.

(6) NED lists its affiliated Russia Dissidents (2011)
http://www.ned.org/events/elections-in-russia-polling-and-perspectives

Sep 14, 2011 Sponsor: NED Elections in Russia: Polling and Perspectives

Featuring: Denis Volkov – Yuri Levada Center

Panel Discussion: Angela Stent – Georgetown University Vladimir
Kara-Murza – Solidarnost (“Solidarity”) David Satter – Hudson Institute

Moderator: Nadia M. Diuk National Endowment for Democracy

Mr. Denis Volkov presented recent data from polls conducted by the
Levada Center, Russia’s most highly regarded independent polling
organization.Topics included:

     * Mood of the electorate in the run up to the Duma and presidential
elections     * Perceptions of candidates and parties     * Voter
confidence in the system of “managed democracy” that has been
established over the last decade.

The Levada Center’s research on nationalist incidents such as the Manezh
riots of December 2010 and the challenges faced by Russia’s civil
society will also be discussed.

A panel of distinguished experts commented on the polling and offered
their own views and analysis of Russia’s political trajectory. Biographies

Denis Volkov earned his M.A. in Political Science from the Moscow School
of Social and Economic Sciences and Manchester University, and has
attended post-graduate programs at Stanford University and Philadelphia
University. Mr. Volkov currently serves as a researcher and head of PR
and Development at the Yuri Levada Center, a Moscow-based independent
analytical center. Mr. Volkov is a regular commentator on
socio-political issues in Russia and his work is often featured in
Novaya Gazeta, Gazeta.ru, and Ezhednevny Zhurnal. Mr. Volkov’s current
research includes work on the sources and limits of democratization in
Russia, youth political engagement, and digital media and
socio-political change in Russia.

Angela Stent is Director of the Center for Eurasian, Russian and East
European Studies and Professor of Government and Foreign Service at
Georgetown University. From 2004-2006 she served as National
Intelligence Officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence
Council. Among her numerous publications are Russia and Germany Reborn:
Unification, the Soviet Collapse and The New Europe (Princeton, 1999)
and Restoration and Revolution in Putin's Foreign Policy (2008).

Vladimir Kara-Murza is a member of the federal council of Solidarnost
(“Solidarity”), Russia’s democratic opposition movement. He has served
as campaign chairman for presidential candidate Vladimir Bukovsky
(2007–08) and advisor to Duma opposition leader Boris Nemtsov.
Kara-Murza was a candidate for the Russian parliament in the 2003
elections, representing the Union of Right Forces and Yabloko parties.
He is the author of Reform or Revolution: The Quest for Responsible
Government in the First Russian State Duma (Moscow 2011) and a
contributor to Russia’s Choices: The Duma Elections and After (London
2003) and Russian Liberalism: Ideas and People (Moscow 2007). He is the
Washington bureau chief of RTVi television.

David Satter is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a fellow of
the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins University School of
Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He has written three books about
Russia: It Was a Long Time Ago and It Never Happened Anyway: Russia and
the Communist Past (Yale, 2011); Age of Delirium: the Decline and Fall
of the Soviet Union (Knopf, 1996; paperback, Yale 2001); and Darkness at
Dawn: the Rise of the Russian Criminal State (Yale 2003).

(7) NED lists its affiliated Russia Dissidents (2013)

http://www.ned.org/es/node/2935

Oct 15, 2013 Sponsor: Forum Russia: A Postmodern Dictatorship?

presented by

The International Forum for Democratic Studies at the National Endowment
for Democracy, the Legatum Institute, and the Institute of Modern Russia.

Russia: A Postmodern Dictatorship?

With

     * Pavel Khodorkovsky, President, Institute of Modern Russia     *
Peter Pomerantsev, Journalist, Producer and Author     * Vladimir V.
Kara-Murza, Member of the Federal Council, Republican Party of
Russia-People's Freedom Party     * Christopher Walker, Executive
Director, International Forum for Democratic Studies

Introductory Remarks

     * Carl Gershman, President, National Endowment for Democracy

Moderated by Christian Caryl, Editor, Democracy Lab and a Senior Fellow
at the Legatum Institute.

Tuesday, October 15, 2013 4:00–5:30 pm

With his third (de facto fourth) term well underway, Vladimir Putin
continues to use the language and institutions of democratic capitalism
to consolidate his power. The panel discussed how Russia’s democratic
façade has masked the construction of a new authoritarian model.

The appearance of democratic institutions, including pseudo-elections,
some elements of media freedom, and a quasi-market economy, has helped
subdue external criticism, while Russia’s hard-edged influence in its
region and in global affairs remains strong. Christian Caryl moderated a
conversation on how this new authoritarianism works inside Russia, what
it means for relationships with the West, and how it affects what
Russia’s leadership views as its “near abroad.”

The discussion was based on “Russia: A Postmodern Dictatorship?” by
Peter Pomerantsev. This was the first in a series of studies
commissioned jointly by the Legatum Institute and the Institute of
Modern Russia to analyze the challenges of transition in the former
Soviet Union.

About the Speakers

Peter Pomerantsev is a British author and documentary producer. His
writing on Russia features regularly in the London Review of Books,
Newsweek/Daily Beast, openDemocracy, Le Monde Diplomatique and other
European and US publications. He has also worked as a consultant on EU
and World Bank development projects in the former USSR. He is the winner
of the SOPA (Society of Press in Asia) award for writing about Mongolia
and was a fellow of the 'Russia in Global Dialogue' program at the
Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen (IWM) in Vienna. His first
book on society and politics in 21st Century Russia will be published by
Faber in 2013.

Vladimir V. Kara-Murza is a member of the federal council of the
Republican Party of Russia–People’s Freedom Party. He was a candidate
for the Russian parliament in 2003, and has served as the campaign
chairman for presidential candidate Vladimir Bukovsky (2007–08) and as
an advisor to Duma opposition leader Boris Nemtsov (2000–03). He is a
senior policy advisor at the Institute of Modern Russia and a member of
the Coordinating Council of the Russian Opposition.

Christopher Walker is executive director of the National Endowment for
Democracy’s International Forum for Democratic Studies, a leading center
for the analysis of the theory and practice of democratic development.
Prior to joining the NED in July 2012, Walker was vice president for
strategy and analysis at Freedom House. He has been published in the
Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Washington Post, Journal of
Democracy, and a range of other publications.

Carl Gershman has been president of the National Endowment for Democracy
since its founding in 1984. He presides over the Endowment’s grants
program in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, the former
Soviet Union, and Latin America, and has overseen the creation of NED’s
signature programs and publications.

Pavel Khodorkovsky founded the Institute of Modern Russia (IMR) in 2010
to continue the work his father Mikhail Khodorkovsky began through the
Open Russia Foundation. IMR is committed to strengthening respect for
human rights, the rule of law, and civil society in Russia, and to
promoting a principles-based approach to U.S.-Russia relations and
Russia's integration into the community of democracies.

Christian Caryl is editor of Democracy Lab, a Legatum Institute website
published in partnership with Foreign Policy magazine. Democracy Lab
follows global transitions from authoritarianism to democracy. Caryl
worked for a year as Washington bureau chief of RFE/RL, and from 2000 to
2009 he was a foreign correspondent for Newsweek, running the magazine's
bureaus in Moscow and Tokyo.

National Endowment for Democracy 1025 F Street NW, Suite 800 Washington,
DC 20004 / (202) 378-9700 info@ned.org

(8) Institute of Modern Russia "a think tank based in New York"

http://imrussia.org/en/about-us

Institute of Modern Russia

About us

The Institute of Modern Russia (IMR) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan public
policy organization—a think tank based in New York. IMR's mission is to
foster democratic and economic development in Russia through research,
advocacy, public events, and grant-making. We are committed to
strengthening respect for human rights, the rule of law, and civil
society in Russia. Our goal is to promote a principles-based approach to
US-Russia relations and Russia's integration into the community of
democracies.

IMR is a federal tax-exempt Section 501(c)(3) public charity,
incorporated in New Jersey.

Staff Contributors Trustees

Pavel Khodorkovsky, President #

Pavel Khodorkovsky is the president of the Institute of Modern Russia,
an organization he founded to continue the work his father, Mikhail
Khodorkovsky, began through the Open Russia Foundation. The Institute of
Modern Russia seeks to promote the development of civil society in
Russia by reinforcing the rule of law and strengthening relationships
between Russia and other countries. Since his father’s arrest in 2003,
Khodorkovsky has been unable to return to Russia for fear of political
persecution and actions against him aimed at pressuring his father to
abandon his legal battle.

Khodorkovsky holds a degree in business administration from Babson
College. In 2011, he cofounded Enertiv, a cleantech energy monitoring
company.

Lidiya Dukhovich, Director #

Lidiya Dukhovich is the director and in-house counsel of the Institute
of Modern Russia. She holds a B.A. in political science with a minor in
economics from Fordham University and a J.D. from Brooklyn Law School,
specializing in international law. Previously, she served as IMR’s legal
counsel, after four years with the New York City Council. She is
licensed to practice law and is an active member of the bar in New York,
New Jersey, and Florida.

Maria Logan, Secretary and Treasurer #

Maria Logan, a native of St. Petersburg, Russia, received her master’s
degree in international law from American University and her M.B.A. from
Georgetown University. From 2001 to 2008, Logan was part of the
litigation practice group at the international law firm Greenberg
Traurig. In 2008, she formed her own consultancy practice focusing on
Russia and international business and legal affairs.

Boris Bruk, Researcher #

Boris Bruk is an expert in democratic governance, organizational
development in the public sector, and Russian and U.S. domestic and
foreign policy. Previously, he worked as an advisor on international
cooperation for the Saratov regional administration in Russia. He was
involved, either as an expert or as a coordinator, in a number of
projects with participation of the World Bank, the European Commission,
and the UK Department for International Development. He has conducted
large-scale research for the Commonwealth of Virginia, completed an
internship with the Russian-American Chamber of Commerce, and
volunteered with the American Red Cross. Bruk holds a Ph.D. in public
administration and policy and an M.P.A from Virginia Technical
Institute, as well as an M.A. in international studies from the
University of Wyoming.

Vladimir V. Kara-Murza, Senior Policy Advisor #

Vladimir Kara-Murza is the author of Reform or Revolution: The Quest for
Responsible Government in the First Russian State Duma (Moscow 2011),
and a contributor to Russia’s Choices: The Duma Elections and After
(London 2003) and Russian Liberalism: Ideas and People (Moscow 2007). In
2005, he produced They Chose Freedom, a television documentary on
dissent in the Soviet Union. From 2004 to 2012, he served as the
Washington bureau chief of RTVi television, and was previously a
correspondent for Novye Izvestia and Kommersant newspapers, and
editor-in-chief of the Russian Investment Review. Kara-Murza was a
candidate for the Russian parliament in 2003, and has served as an
advisor to Duma opposition leader Boris Nemtsov (2000–03), and as
campaign chairman for presidential candidate Vladimir Bukovsky
(2007–08). He is a member of the Coordinating Council of the Russian
Opposition, as well as of the federal council of the Republican Party of
Russia–People’s Freedom Party and of the Solidarity movement. His op-eds
have appeared in the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the
Financial Times, the National Post, and World Affairs. Vladimir
Kara-Murza holds an M.A. in history from Cambridge University, England.

Olga Khvostunova, Editor-in-Chief of imrussia.org #

Olga Khvostunova is IMR’s political analyst and researcher. She is a
well-published journalist and academic writer, and coauthor of Media and
Politics, a textbook for graduate students. Previously, she worked as a
contributing editor at Kommersant Publishing House in Moscow (2005–2010)
and an associate professor in Moscow State University’s journalism
department. Her areas of expertise include political linguistics, media,
think tanks, Russian politics, and energy markets. She holds a master’s
and a Ph.D. in political science (political communications) from
Lomonosov Moscow State University. As a 2010 Fulbright Scholar, she
conducted a research project on U.S. and Russian think tanks at Columbia
University’s Harriman Institute.

Michael Weiss, Editor-in-Chief of The Interpreter #

Michael Weiss is editor-in-chief of The Interpreter, as well as a
columnist for Foreign Policy, the Daily Beast, and NOW Lebanon. A
longtime journalist, Weiss has covered the Syrian revolution from its
inception, reporting from refugee camps in southern Turkey and from the
frontlines of war-torn Aleppo. He has broken several news stories for
Foreign Policy, including how Iran has given virtually free oil to the
Assad regime in Syria (based on leaked state documents); how Angola’s
energy sector works closely with a Swiss commodities trader (and how an
Angolan general profits from the relationship); and how Russia fired
Grad missiles into eastern Ukraine. He founded The Interpreter as a news
and translation service in May 2013. In just over a year, the website
has become a high-traffic resource for journalists, diplomats, and
policymakers from around the world, with its articles cited by
presidents, parliamentarians, ambassadors, and supranational governing
bodies.

Grace Lee, Project Coordinator #

Grace Lee is the project coordinator for the Institute of Modern Russia.
She is a recent graduate of Hamilton College, where she received a B.A.
in Russian studies with a minor in government. During her junior year
abroad, she attended Smolny College of Liberal Arts and Sciences in St.
Petersburg, Russia, and was later awarded a Fulbright grant to teach
English at Moscow State region Social-Humanitarian Institute in Kolomna,
Russia. She is fluent in Russian.

Donald N. Jensen #

Donald N. Jensen is a resident fellow at the Center for Transatlantic
Relations in the Nitze School of International Studies at Johns Hopkins
University, where he writes extensively on the politics and foreign
policies of Russia and the former Soviet states. He is a regular
commentator on post-Soviet affairs for CNBC, Fox Business, and the VOA
Russian Service. From 1996 to 2008 he was associate director of
broadcasting and director of research at Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, where he was instrumental in expanding the station’s
broadcasting to Central Asia, Iran, Afghanistan, and the North Caucasus,
and broadening its web presence. He served in Moscow and Sofia as a
Foreign Service officer from 1985–1996, and was a member of the first
ten-man U.S. team to inspect Soviet missile bases under the Intermediate
Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1988. Jensen received his B.A. from Columbia
University and his master’s and Ph.D. in government from Harvard
University. He is fluent in Russian.

Ekaterina Mishina #

A Russian lawyer, Ekaterina Mishina graduated from Lomonosov Moscow
State University’s Law School, from which she also holds a Ph.D. in law.
She worked for the Constitutional Court of Russia, then headed
Mostelecom’s legal department. From 2002–2005 she took part in the
Law-Making and Regional Journalism projects of the Open Russia
Foundation, and from 2007–2010, she worked on two large-scale projects
for the INDEM (Information Science for Democracy) Foundation. In the
capacity of either general manager or legal expert, she participated in
several projects for the World Bank, the Ford Foundation, the European
Union, and USAID. She was a visiting scholar at New York University from
1990–1991, had internships in the U.S. Congress and the Washington,
D.C., law offices of Gardner, Carton & Douglas in 1993, and took part in
the U.S. Department of State’s U.S.-Russia Experts Forum in 2006. In
2005–2014 she worked as an assistant professor for the National Research
University’s Higher School of Economics in Moscow, where she taught
comparative constitutional law and specifics of the reforms in the
former Soviet Union. Currently, she is a visiting professor at the
University of Michigan.

Alexander Podrabinek #

Prominent Russian journalist, writer and human rights activist. His
articles appeared in Novaya Gazeta, Ezhenedelny Journal (Ej.Ru),
Grani.Ru, et al. He is a regular guest at Ekho Moskvy radio station.
Podrabinek is also a well-known Soviet dissident and former political
prisoner. In 1977, he published a book on psychiatric repressions in the
USSR titled Punitive Medicine. It was later published in the United
States (in Russian) and Canada (in English).

Elena Servettaz #

Elena Servettaz is a Russian-French journalist and newscaster at Radio
France Internationale in Paris, where she covers international affairs,
corruption, and money laundering. She is also the editor and author of
the book Why Europe Needs a Magnitsky Law (2013). She is a contributor
to France24, The Interpreter, Figaro, Madame, Echo of Moscow, TV Rain,
and others. Previously, she worked as the parliamentary correspondent
and a special reporter for Moscow Channel 3 and as a correspondent for
NTV’s political talk show Freedom of Speech. Servettaz is a graduate of
Lomonosov Moscow State University and the French Press Institute in Paris.

Tatyana Stanovaya #

Tatyana Stanovaya is a political analyst with over fifteen years of
experience in the field of Russian and foreign politics. She graduated
from the International Independent Eco-Politological University with a
degree in political science, as well as from Moscow State University
with a degree in public administration. She has authored more than 2,000
articles with a focus on political parties, elections, interest groups
within the Kremlin, and the “gas wars” in the post-soviet space
(published on Politcom.ru, RIA Novosti, and Slon.ru.). Stanovaya
currently heads the analytics department of the Center for Political
Technologies (CPT) in Moscow. She also represents CPT in France,
specializing in reputation management, quality sociological research,
and public relations for political agents and business. She also blogs
for her own website, stanovaya.com.

Lyudmila Alexeeva #

Lyudmila Alexeeva is chairwoman of the Moscow Helsinki Group, Russia’s
leading human rights organization. In the 1980s, she was one of the
original Soviet-era dissidents who spoke out against repression. From
1999 to 2004, she served as president of the International Helsinki
Federation of Human Rights, an umbrella group of human rights
organizations from thirty-eight countries.

Pavel Khodorkovsky #

Pavel Khodorkovsky is the president of the Institute of Modern Russia,
an organization he founded to continue the work his father, Mikhail
Khodorkovsky, began through the Open Russia Foundation. The Institute of
Modern Russia seeks to promote the development of civil society in
Russia by reinforcing the rule of law and strengthening relationships
between Russia and other countries. Since his father’s arrest in 2003,
Khodorkovsky has been unable to return to Russia for fear of political
persecution and actions against him aimed at pressuring his father to
abandon his legal battle. Khodorkovsky holds a degree in business
administration from Babson College. In 2011, he cofounded Enertiv, a
cleantech energy monitoring company.

Robert Louis Arsenault, Jr. #

Robert Louis Arsenault, Jr., is president of the International League
for Human Rights, a non-governmental organization based in New York. For
sixty years, this organization has been raising human-rights issues and
cases before the UN and other intergovernmental organizations, helping
to amplify their voices and coordinate strategies for effective
human-rights protection.

Margery Kraus #

Margery Kraus is founder and executive officer of APCO Worldwide, a
global consulting firm headquartered in Washington, that specializes in
public affairs, communication, and business consulting for major
multinationals.

Lidiya Dukhovich #

Lidiya Dukhovich is the director and in-house counsel of the Institute
of Modern Russia. She holds a B.A. in political science with a minor in
economics from Fordham University and a J.D. from Brooklyn Law School,
specializing in international law. Previously, she served as IMR’s legal
counsel, after four years with the New York City Council. She is
licensed to practice law and is an active member of the bar in New York,
New Jersey, and Florida.

Donations

If you wish to make a tax-deductible donation to the Institute of Modern
Russia or one of its projects, please mail a check to our address.

For any inquiries or questions please mail to:     National Registered
Agents, Inc. of NJ     100 Canal Pointe Blvd., Suite 212     Princeton,
NJ 08540 USA     tel. +1 646 400 0607     fax +1 646 400 0611
office@imrussia.org

(9) Arab Spring: 'A Virus that will attack Moscow and Beijing' - John
McCain (2011)

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/11/the-arab-spring-a-virus-that-will-attack-moscow-and-beijing/248762/

The Arab Spring: 'A Virus That Will Attack Moscow and Beijing'

Steve Clemons Nov 19 2011, 5:53 AM ET

Former presidential candidate and US Senator John McCain's comment was a
biting kicker at opening dinner of 2011 Halifax International Security
Forum.

I'm up at the 2011 Halifax International Security Forum where 18 defense
ministers and a who's who of the international defense and security
community have assembled.  The forum is modestly sized with about 200
attendees -- but the diversity of perspective here is impressive.

I'll have a post up in a while on US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta's
appeal to allies in an "era of austerity" -- but wanted to get something
up now that John McCain tagged on to his otherwise very humorous remarks
at the opening dinner last night.

After Senator Mark Udall used his time on stage mostly to joke about
American and Canadian hockey -- a theme nearly everyone here can't stay
away from -- McCain jested that in Arizona, mothers tell their kids that
they'll never grow up to be President -- as Barry Goldwater, Bruce
Babbitt, Morris Udall (Mark's dad), and McCain had all tried and failed.
  McCain was truly funny -- his sense of timing better than Udall's.

But then sensing that a crowd of generals, admirals, defense ministers,
and national security policy practitioners prefer gravitas to slapstick,
McCain dropped a pretty big zinger on the crowd.

He said, "A year ago, Ben-Ali and Gaddafi were not in power.  Assad
won't be in power this time next year.  This Arab Spring is a virus that
will attack Moscow and Beijing." McCain then walked off the stage.

Comparing the Arab Spring to a virus is not new for the Senator -- but
to my knowledge, coupling Russia and China to the comment is.

Senator McCain's framing reflects a triumphalism bouncing around at this
conference.  It sees the Arab Spring as a product of Western design --
and potentially as a tool to take on other non-democratic governments.

At an earlier session, Senator Udall said that those who believed that
the Arab Spring was an organic revolution from within these countries
were wrong -- and that the West and NATO in particular had been primary
drivers of results in Libya -- and that the West had helped animate and
move affairs in Egypt.  Udall provocatively added Syria to that list as
well.

But John McCain's biting kicker last night would have been seriously
jarring to any Chinese or Russian defense types who might have been in
the room.  They seem to be the only ones not here.

McCain may be right that fake democracies like Russia and authoritarian
regimes like China may face the same kinds of disruptions in their locks
on power that Gaddafi and Ben-Ali did, but to frame this possibility as
objective -- which was the tone of McCain's comment -- seriously
complicates the global security picture particularly when the US and
Europe are hoping to draw Russia and China into a much more cooperative
arrangement confining Iran's options in the world.

It's tough to partner with regimes on one front while essentially
calling for their collapse and downfall on another.

Steve Clemons is Washington editor at large for The Atlantic and editor
of Atlantic Live. He writes frequently about politics and foreign
affairs. More

Clemons is a senior fellow and the founder of the American Strategy
Program at the New America Foundation, a centrist think tank in
Washington, D.C., where he previously served as executive vice
president. He writes and speaks frequently about the D.C. political
scene, foreign policy, and national security issues, as well as domestic
and global economic-policy challenges.